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ARTICLE 
CLAIMING DESIGN 
JEANNE C. FROMER† & MARK P. MCKENNA†† 
Design stands out among intellectual property subject matter in terms of the extent 
of overlapping protection available. Different forms of intellectual property usually 
protect different aspects of a product. In the design context, however, precisely the 
same features are often subject to design patent, trademark, and copyright 
protection—and parties commonly claim more than one of those forms. Yet, as we 
show, the claiming regimes of these three forms of design protection differ in significant 
ways: the timing of claims; claim format (particularly whether the claims are visual 
or verbal); the multiplicity of claims (whether and how one can make multiple claims 
to the same design); and the level of abstraction at which parties claim rights. These 
methodological differences have significant effects on the operation of each individual 
regime. All of the claiming regimes have significant shortcomings, particularly in 
terms of the quality of notice the claims provide to third parties about their scope. 
That notice problem is worsened, as we argue, by the frequent cumulation of rights 
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in the same design. Claim ambiguity and parties’ ability to switch back and forth 
between different design claims—both within and across legal regimes—make it 
difficult for courts and third parties to evaluate the validity and scope of rights. There 
is significant irony here because intellectual property claims exist almost entirely to 
provide notice. Cumulation also enables design rightsholders to assert rights in one or 
more regimes using the claiming rules that benefit them most at a particular moment, 
without any risk that those claiming choices will bind them in later rights assertions. 
We suggest a number of improvements to each claiming regime that would help 
restore internal order. We also analyze various approaches to ameliorating the amplified 
costs of overlapping regimes for claiming design. In particular, we focus on doctrines of 
election and channeling rules as alternative methods of directing designs to one regime 
or another. We also introduce the possibility of transsubstantive intellectual property 
claiming rules as a way to reduce important inconsistencies across these regimes while 
also allowing protection under multiple regimes. Each of these solutions would alleviate 
at least some of the concerns we identify, though one’s preference among them will likely 
depend on one’s level of concern about overlapping rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Beautiful and thoughtful design is striking. Design is also ascendant. 
From the iPhone to Christian Louboutin shoes to Eames furniture, design 
occupies an increasingly influential role in our culture and economy.1 The 
intellectual property laws that protect design are also striking, but for a 
different reason: the extent of overlapping protection they permit. 
To be sure, design is not the only subject matter that implicates multiple 
forms of intellectual property protection, which are each thought to promote 
creation, innovation, or fair competition in their respective realms. In other 
cases of overlapping protection for a product or service, however, each form 
covers a different aspect of the subject matter. Software, for example, is 
potentially subject to both utility patent and copyright protection.2 But utility 
patent protects only the functional aspects of software, whereas copyright law 
protects only its nonfunctional, expressive aspects.3 
 
1 See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 
447-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing the financial success and cultural significance of 
Louboutin’s acclaimed red-soled shoes), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 
2012); Tim Bradshaw, Designers on the Ascendant in Silicon Valley, FIN. TIMES (July 7, 2013), 
https://www.ft.com/content/b587e678-e42c-11e2-91a3-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/PV45-
69EG] (explaining that designers now play crucial roles in startup companies as a result of 
Apple’s influence); Sophie Gilbert, The Vision of Charles and Ray Eames, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/11/charles-and-ray-eames-
beyond-the-chair/415764/ [https://perma.cc/CV2U-5DYF] (describing the immense success of 
Eames furniture and its lasting influence on modern designers at companies including Apple 
and Ikea); see also, e.g., ALICE RAWSTHORN, HELLO WORLD: WHERE DESIGN MEETS LIFE 
iv (2014) (noting that design is a tool that brings about “scientific, technological, cultural, 
political, economic, social, environmental or behavioral” changes). 
2 For a thorough exploration of the roles of utility patent and copyright in the software context, 
see Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of Patents, 71 FLA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3250496. See also 
Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293, 1320-24 (2017) 
[hereinafter Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality] (discussing copyright’s filtering analysis for computer 
software); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1505 (2010) 
(“Given that writing computer source code is more about problem solving than problem finding, it is 
an uneasy fit in copyright law, in which the protectability standard is tailor-made for expression valued 
for its problem finding.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (2003) (underscoring that “the already much eroded distinction between 
patent and copyright subject matter would almost completely disappear for digital technologies” if 
patent were to be “limited to physical artifacts”). 
3 See, e.g., Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality, supra note 2, at 1320 (“The code’s functional 
components, however, are not protectable [by copyright], so courts must screen them out and 
focus only on the remaining expression.”). In this context, like others involving subject matter 
overlap, courts have developed substantial doctrine for the purpose of channeling protection of 
distinct aspects of the subject matter to a particular regime. See id. at 1320-21 (citing cases in 
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Design is different. Unlike the complementary use of different forms of 
intellectual property for different aspects of other sorts of subject matter, 
parties commonly claim multiple forms of protection for precisely the same 
features of a design. For example, Puma recently sued fast-fashion retailer 
Forever 21, asserting design patent, trademark, and copyright infringement; 
Puma alleged that Forever 21 copied the same features of three footwear 
designs that it had developed in collaboration with singer Rihanna, one of 
which is shown in Figure 1.4 
 
Figure 1: Bow Slides from Puma and Forever 215 
 
Each relevant legal regime—design patent, trademark, and copyright—makes 
some effort to channel protection of design’s functional features to utility patent 
law. But intellectual property law is largely comfortable with overlapping 
protection for design’s nonfunctional aspects. The various forms of design 
protection can have complementary or cumulative economic effect, as each legal 
regime might imbue the claimant with somewhat different substantive rights and 
 
which the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test was applied). Considerable debate has arisen 
around the effectiveness of those doctrines. 
4 Amended Complaint at 3-12, Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 17-2523 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 
2017) [hereinafter Puma Amended Complaint]; see also Complaint at 11-17, Skinny Brand Jeans 
LLC v. QVC, Inc., No. 18-2011 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2018) (asserting trade dress, unfair competition, 
and copyright infringement claims against QVC, which allegedly copied Skinny Brand Jeans’s 
“unique, innovative, distinctive and recognizable slimming wash pattern” and “stomach 
restraining panel” for women’s jeans). 
5 Puma Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 9. 
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make different remedies available. As a result, strategic parties are often able to 
use design patent, trademark, and copyright laws cumulatively or as substitutes. 
One of us has elaborated elsewhere on the problem of cumulation of 
intellectual property rights.6 But even those not disposed to regard 
cumulation as problematic in principle7 ought to be concerned about the 
considerable differences in claiming methodologies across design patent, 
trademark, and copyright. At the very least, those differences undermine 
notice and create worrisome opportunities for strategic behavior. 
Take, for example, the plaintiff ’s claim in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc.8 In that landmark trademark case, Taco Cabana, a fast-food Mexican 
restaurant chain, claimed as its trade dress the exterior and interior design of 
its restaurants,9 which it characterized as consisting of 
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated 
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior 
and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the 
outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building 
is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes. 
Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.10 
 
6 See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 824 (2011) [hereinafter 
McKenna, (Dys)Functionality] (discussing the cumulation of rights in trademark law resulting from 
“courts differ[ing] over the extent to which the [functionality] doctrine focuses on competitors’ right 
to copy unpatented features as opposed to their need to copy”); Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2013) [hereinafter 
McKenna & Strandburg, Progress] (worrying about a design patent regime that overlaps with utility 
patent, trade dress, and copyright laws). 
7 Compare 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07 
(2016) (arguing that there is no reason that the same design cannot be protected by both copyright 
and patent laws) with Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights: Subject 
Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 36, 73-89 (2011) [hereinafter Beckerman-Rodau, Problem] 
(concluding that overlapping protection “undermines the careful balance individually developed 
under each body of intellectual property law”); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: 
The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1476 (2004) 
[hereinafter Moffat, Mutant Copyrights] (“[T]he availability of overlapping intellectual property 
protection in all of its forms presents a serious threat to the goals and purposes of federal intellectual 
property policy . . . .”); Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and 
Patent Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1512-16 (2017) [hereinafter Samuelson, Strategies] 
(criticizing the overlap of copyright and utility patent protections for undermining intellectual 
property law’s careful balance of encouraging creation while avoiding monopolies that stifle progress 
and creativity). For an article acknowledging troublesome aspects of overlapping intellectual property 
protections but arguing that “eliminating such overlaps as a structural matter would be inadvisable,” 
see Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights Versus Selection of 
Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 275 (2013) [hereinafter Heymann, Overlapping]. 
8 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
9 Id. at 766. 
10 Id. at 765 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The generality of that description is remarkable, particularly in light of 
the photographs Taco Cabana entered into the record. As shown on the left 
in Figure 2, the most visually striking aspect of Taco Cabana’s restaurant 
design is its primarily pink color. Had Taco Cabana been forced to articulate 
the elements of its trade dress prior to and independently of its dispute with 
Two Pesos, it seems likely that the color pink would have featured 
prominently in that description. But because Taco Cabana could enforce its 
rights without having to register the trade dress,11 it was never forced to 
delineate its claim before the dispute. Once it confronted Two Pesos’ blue 
design, Taco Cabana surely was not going to emphasize the pink color 
scheme. Instead, it strategically claimed its trade dress to capture Two Pesos’ 
specific design choices, highlighting a more general “festive eating 
atmosphere” and “festive and vivid color scheme.”12 
 
Figure 2: Photographs of Taco Cabana (Left) and Two Pesos (Right) 
Restaurants13 
 
There are good reasons to allow parties to assert rights in unregistered 
trademarks.14 Registration favors large, sophisticated companies, which 
generally are familiar with the registration system and have the resources to 
seek registration for each new potential trademark.15 The availability of 
 
11 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2000); Two Pesos, 
505 U.S. at 768. 
12 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765-66. 
13 Two Pesos v. Cabana, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://courses2.cit.cornell.edu/sociallaw/
student_projects/Tradedresspage2.html#_edn20 (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
14 That said, courts’ extension of federal law to allow claims based on unregistered rights 
altered the traditional relationship between trademark and unfair competition laws in ways that were 
not fully considered. See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 288, 289 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (“[T]he 
persistent sense that federal and state law regulate concurrently has masked a significant 
federalization of trademark and unfair competition law over the last forty to fifty years.”). 
15 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1313, 1350 (2012) (“The relative advantage in litigation costs enjoyed by large corporations 
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unregistered rights makes it easier for smaller, less sophisticated companies 
to claim rights without significant expense. Unregistered rights are also 
substantially more flexible. A party that goes to the expense of registering a 
mark has some incentive to stick with that mark over longer periods of time, 
whereas unregistered rights are better suited to marks that might be adapted 
or used in connection with different goods or services over time. 
Recognition of unregistered rights is also consistent with foundational 
American trademark principles because trademark rights have always arisen 
out of use rather than registration.16 
Still, the flexibility of unregistered rights can have real costs. One obvious 
cost is a lack of notice regarding the scope of rights claimed by a party. Before 
litigation, Two Pesos could only have observed Taco Cabana’s use in the 
marketplace and made an educated guess as to the features of any trade dress 
owned by Taco Cabana. Based on its observation, Two Pesos might reasonably 
have believed that, if Taco Cabana had any rights to the design of its 
restaurants, the color pink was an essential—and central—part of the trade 
dress. Indeed, Two Pesos might have chosen to use blue in its restaurant 
design precisely to avoid infringement. 
Relatedly, the flexibility of unregistered rights enables strategic behavior on 
the part of claimants. Because it was able to defer claiming until it asserted its 
rights against Two Pesos, Taco Cabana was able to define its trade dress to 
encompass Two Pesos’ design. It might not have been able to do so if it had been 
forced to claim earlier and independently of the particular dispute. In addition, 
trademark law has no rules fixing the level of generality at which trade dress 
must be described.17 Taco Cabana was thus able to claim without referencing 
specific features that might have contrasted with corresponding features of the 
Two Pesos design or invited comparisons to the designs of the many other 
Mexican restaurants whose restaurants predated Taco Cabana’s. As a result, Taco 
Cabana was able to leave the scope of its rights open in other cases. 
To compare design patent claiming, consider luxury Italian footwear 
company Aquazzura’s recently settled case against Ivanka Trump.18 Aquazzura 
 
enables them continuously to expand the scope of trademark protection at the expense of small 
businesses that can ill-afford to protect their rights in lengthy court battles.”); cf. Jessica M. 
Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in Trademark Enforcement 
Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 221-23 (2014) (commenting on the “numerous direct and 
indirect costs” of trademark enforcement and protection). 
16 See, e.g., Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 287 (6th Cir. 1900) (“It is the 
party who uses it first as a brand for his goods, and builds up a business under it, who is entitled to 
protection, and not the one who first thought of using it on similar goods, but did not use it.” 
(quoting George v. Smith, 52 F. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1892))). 
17 Infra Section I.B. 
18 Aquazzura v. Ivanka Trump Settle Suit, FASHION LAW (Nov. 18, 2017), http://www.
thefashionlaw.com/home/a-trumped-up-trial-aquazzura-v-ivanka-trump [https://perma.cc/8RXJ-ER9W]; 
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holds a design patent for the design of one of its popular shoes,19 known as 
the Christy, which comes in both flat and pump versions.20 As we detail 
below, design patent claims consist of drawings, which are typically made 
early and independently of any dispute. Aquazurra’s design patent claims to 
the Christy are shown below in the left two pictures in Figure 3. One version 
of the Christy marketed by Aquazurra is shown on the right in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Aquazzura Christy Design Patent21 and As Sold22 
 
After Aquazzura’s Christy shoes achieved success in the market, Ivanka 
Trump began selling her Tropica shoe, shown in Figure 4. The Tropica shares 
some design elements with the shoe depicted in Aquazzura’s design patent, 
particularly similar lacing, straps, and overall shape. Yet there are also 
differences in the lacing and strap pattern. Most obviously, Trump’s Tropica 
laces pass through three sets of eyelets, whereas Aquazurra’s Christy laces pass 
through only two sets.23 Thus, the Tropica is not identical to Aquazurra’s 
 
see also Second Amended Complaint at 2, Aquazzura Italia SRL v. Trump, No. 16-4782 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 
2017), 2017 WL 1506103 (bringing trademark and design patent infringement claims); Aquazzura Adds Design 
Patent Infringement Claim to Trump Lawsuit, FASHION LAW (Nov. 4, 2016 [hereinafter Trump Lawsuit]), 
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/aquazzura-adds-design-patent-infringement-claim-to-trump-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/J2ZX-UCZ3] (“Even more recently, Aquazzura has expanded the breadth of its trade 
dress infringement suit against Trump, opting to add a design patent infringement claim to the mix, 
as well.”). At the time of settlement, Aquazzura had limited its claims to those for infringement of 
the design of another shoe, the Wild Thing, despite media reports that it was also asserting 
infringement claims of the Christy design. 
19 U.S. Patent No. D750,359. 
20 Aquazzura Awarded Design Patent for Hot-Selling Shoe Design, FASHION LAW (Mar. 17, 2016), 
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/aquazzura-awarded-design-patent-protection [https://perma.cc/
A5RJ-XL63]. 
21 U.S. Patent No. D750,359. 
22 Trump Lawsuit, supra note 18. 
23 See Real vs. Steal—Aquazzura Christy Lace-Up Flats, IN THEIR CLOSET (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://intheircloset.com/aquazzura-christy-lace-up-pointed-toe-flats [https://perma.cc/N6FV-PSS3] 
(listing many other knockoff versions of the Aquazzura Christy shoe, and observing that Trump’s 
Tropica version is not identical, though it is similar). 
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claimed design. While design patent infringement does not require identity,24 
the design against which a court will have to compare the Tropica is not open 
to new depiction within the context of litigation. 
 
Figure 4: Ivanka Trump’s Tropica Shoe25 
 
These examples highlight significant differences between the trademark 
and design patent claiming regimes. One difference has to do with the timing 
of claims. Depending on the regime, claiming can happen shortly after design 
creation or well after commercialization. And it can happen in the context of a 
design patent application filed independently of any dispute or in the context 
of a particular assertion of rights. Another difference relates to claim format. 
Design patent claiming is entirely visual, whereas trade dress claiming is verbal. 
Both types of claims can vary in terms of the claim’s level of generality. These 
differences in timing and format interact with and complicate the several other 
dimensions along which claiming in intellectual property can differ.26 
A party’s claiming choices can be consequential for the scope of its rights 
in a design, and they can shape legal and business incentives. Design patent 
law forces claimants to think through the scope of their claimed rights at the 
time of application, which may be early in the design’s lifecycle. At that point, 
it may be relatively difficult for the designer to anticipate the range of 
alternative designs competitors might develop. Early claiming might also 
force a designer to think more carefully, and at an earlier stage, about the ways 
it is likely to market the design and about the extent and nature of 
competition the design will face. Conversely, later claiming allows for greater 
experimentation with different designs and more opportunity to assert rights 
 
24 Infra Section I.A. 
25 MACY’S, Ivanka Trump Tropica Lace-Up Flats, https://www.macys.com/shop/product/ivanka-
trump-tropica-lace-up-flats?ID=4654617 [https://perma.cc/UKA9-7455] (last visited Aug. 29, 2018). 
26 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 719 
(2009) [hereinafter Fromer, Claiming] (discussing the various dimensions of claiming in patent and 
copyright, including central, peripheral, characteristic, and exemplar claiming). 
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strategically as the competitive environment develops. In terms of claim 
format, visual claiming tends to focus viewers on a design’s gestalt—though 
perhaps in skewed ways—rather than individual features. Verbal claiming 
likely does the opposite. 
As we discuss below, both design patent and trademark’s claiming 
regimes have significant shortcomings, just as copyright’s does, particularly 
in terms of the quality of notice the claims provide to third parties about 
their scope. Those notice problems are worsened by the frequent cumulation 
of rights in the same design. Claim ambiguity and parties’ ability to switch 
back and forth between different design claims—both within and across legal 
regimes—makes it difficult for courts or third parties to evaluate the validity 
and scope of rights. There is significant irony here because intellectual 
property claims exist almost entirely to provide notice, whether to 
government officials or third parties ascertaining protectability or 
determining the scope of rights.27 Cumulation also enables design 
rightsholders to assert rights in one or more regimes using the claiming rules 
that benefit them most at a particular moment, without any real risk that its 
claiming choices will bind it in future rights assertions. 
Importantly, the problems with the claiming regimes in these areas and 
the costs of variation in claiming methodology across systems are not the 
result of considered policy judgments by which the costs were accepted as 
regrettable byproducts of important policy gains. Design protection is 
relatively new in trademark law, and courts’ inability to develop a clear and 
consistent claiming methodology in this area is a consequence of their 
expansion of trademark subject matter and infringement doctrine.28 
Copyright’s protection for design has long been uneven, particularly in light 
of the difficulties courts have had with the concept of separability in the 
context of useful articles.29 And copyright’s extremely low originality bar, 
along with its loosening infringement standard, has put more pressure on 
courts to identify the protectable features of the works at issue.30 While the 
design patent statute is old, use of that system has become far more popular 
 
27 See generally Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 731 (“In essence, claiming helps the public 
assess what remains in the public domain and what has been made private.”). The format of claiming 
can affect the quality of notice, as well as ascertainment of scope and the ability to cover works 
grounded in after-developed technologies. Id. at 757-71. 
28 For a description of trademark law’s growth and its connection to increasingly challenging 
issues regarding the scope of rights, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2197, 2215-16 (2016) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Scope]. 
29 See infra Section I.C. 
30 Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2214-15. 
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in recent years,31 and claimants have used it much more commonly for partial 
designs.32 These developments have made claiming in each area both more 
important and more difficult, and they have dramatically increased instances 
of overlapping protection. Thus, in our view, the problems with claiming in 
these areas, and especially their relationship to the problem of overlap, were 
largely accidental and, until now, mostly unconsidered. 
In this Article, after setting out the features of the different claiming 
regimes of design patent, trademark, and copyright laws, we evaluate several 
dimensions of the differences between those claiming regimes, focusing 
primarily on timing, mode of depiction, and level of abstraction. In addition to 
identifying several improvements to each claiming regime, we analyze various 
approaches to ameliorating the amplified costs of overlapping protection. In 
particular, we focus on doctrines of election and channeling rules as alternative 
methods of directing designs to one regime or another. We also introduce the 
possibility of transsubstantive intellectual property claiming rules as a way to 
reduce important inconsistencies across these regimes while also allowing 
protection under multiple regimes. Each of these solutions would alleviate at 
least some of the concerns we identify, though one’s preference among them 
will likely depend on one’s level of concern about overlapping rights. 
I. CLAIMING DESIGNS IN THE LAW 
Given the range of activities and artifacts we colloquially refer to as 
“design”—furniture design, game design, web design, floral design, and even 
the design of processes—the category of “design” can sometimes feel like it 
refers to everything and therefore nothing.33 Designers and scholars of 
design tend to use the term expansively: for example, Karl Ulrich defines 
design as “conceiving and giving form to artifacts that solve problems.”34 
Intellectual property law is not much more precise. Design patent, 
trademark, and copyright laws use varying labels to identify types of design 
 
31 See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual 
Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 104 (2017) (“[S]eeking and asserting design patent 
protection for fashion designs has become increasingly popular.”). 
32 See Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2017) 
[hereinafter Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” in 1887] (describing the once-narrower subject matter 
of design patent law); Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 781, 
781-88 (2018) [hereinafter Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” Today] (describing modern design patent 
law’s more expansive definition of the article of manufacture, and explaining that partial claiming is 
popular because it allows patent owners to protect their inventions even when the defendant’s 
product is not identical). 
33 KARL T. ULRICH, DESIGN: CREATION OF ARTIFACTS IN SOCIETY 1-2 (2011). 
34 Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
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subject to protection, though they do so without conceptual clarity regarding 
the boundaries between categories. 
Design patents are available for any “new, original and ornamental design 
for an article of manufacture.”35 As Sarah Burstein demonstrates, courts once 
had a reasonably constrained idea of what “article[s] of manufacture” were, 
and configurations and surface ornamentations of those things were 
patentable.36 But modern design patent law is more capacious: The Supreme 
Court recently defined an article of manufacture as “simply a thing made by 
hand or machine.”37 Thus, the design of anything made by hand or machine 
is design patent subject matter. 
Trademark law also protects designs, primarily as trade dress.38 The law 
protects both product packaging and product design but subjects them to 
different legal treatment. Packaging is capable of being considered inherently 
distinctive and thus immediately protectable, but design is protectable only 
when it has “acquired distinctiveness” or “secondary meaning.”39 The 
Supreme Court developed this significant distinction, however, without 
defining either product design or packaging.40 
And copyright law protects the broad class of “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” which includes 
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”41 Thus, copyright seems to embrace 
much of what we might ordinarily consider “design.” But, among other 
limitations, the design of a useful article is copyrightable only to the extent 
that its features are “separable” from the utilitarian aspects of the article.42 
 
35 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). 
36 Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, supra note 32, at 83 (arguing that courts understood 
“article of manufacture” to mean a “tangible item made by humans—other than a machine or 
composition of matter—that had a unitary structure and was complete in itself for use or for sale”). 
37 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016). 
38 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765-67 (1992) (holding that inherently 
distinctive, nonfunctional trade dress is protectible under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act without proof 
of secondary meaning). We say primarily because there is a design element to many logos and stylized 
trademarks, which are not trade dress. 
39 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-16 (2000) (“[I]n an action 
for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is 
distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”). A mark acquires 
the requisite secondary meaning when “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a 
product feature . . . is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.” Christian 
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, 696 F.3d 206, 216 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)). 
40 The Supreme Court acknowledged this problem, but instead of defining the categories, it 
simply created a default rule, instructing courts to treat ambiguous subject matter as product design 
and require secondary meaning. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215. 
41 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
42 Id. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates . . . features that 
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Congress intended the separability requirement to distinguish applied art 
from industrial design, making copyright protection potentially available for 
the former but channeling the latter to design or utility patent protection.43 
The Supreme Court recently defined applied art as “art employed in the 
decoration, design, or execution of useful objects.”44 It defined design as “the 
combination of details or features that go to make up” a useful article.45 
Notably, the Court did not attempt to define industrial design. 
We mean here to focus on the various types of designs that design patent, 
trademark, and copyright laws address, despite those regimes’ lack of clear 
definitions.46 Of course, each of those regimes has a somewhat distinct 
justification. Design patent law is generally thought—or at least originally 
was thought—to encourage the creation of industrial design.47 By contrast, 
trademark law enables mark owners to reap the reputational benefits of their 
goods or services by preventing consumer confusion about the source of those 
goods.48 And copyright law aims to encourage the production and 
dissemination of artistic and cultural works.49 Despite these different 
purposes, design patent, trademark, and copyright laws not only all protect 
design, they commonly protect the same aspects of a design. Before turning 
to that overlap in protection, we first consider claiming in design patent, 
trademark, and copyright laws respectively. 
A. Design Patent Claiming 
The inventor of “any new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture” may obtain a design patent, subject to requirements of novelty 
and nonobviousness.50 The Federal Circuit has interpreted “ornamental” to 
 
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.”). 
43 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). 
44 Id. at 1014 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
45 Id. at 1009 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 We do not address here sui generis protection for semiconductor chips or boat hulls, which 
are defined more precisely. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (protecting semiconductor chip 
products); id. §§ 1301(a)(2), (b)(4) (protecting original designs of boat hulls). 
47 See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871) (noting that patent law seeks to 
secure for a limited time the economic benefits flowing from a new and original product to its 
creator); McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6, at 31-32 (discussing Congress’s motive in 
filling a “perceived vacuum of protection” for design patents not otherwise protected by copyright, 
patent, or trademark laws when passing the 1842 design patent statute). 
48 See, e.g., Mark McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
63, 66-72 (2009) (describing this conceptual framing of trademark law before criticizing parts of it). 
49 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 74-76 
(2014) (“[C]opyright law provides the incentive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to authors 
to motivate them to create culturally valuable works.”). 
50 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). 
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mean nonfunctional.51 Because features are functional under prevailing case 
law only when they are “dictated by function,” ornamentality is not a 
significant limitation on patentability;52 nor are design patent’s novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements, particularly relative to the parallel 
requirements in utility patent law.53 
Design patents last for fifteen years from the date of grant.54 The owner 
of a design patent has a right to prevent others from using a similar design 
“if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser 
usually gives, [the] two designs are substantially the same, [and] the 
resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase 
one supposing it to be the other.”55 
To get a design patent, the inventor must apply to the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO), which examines the claimed design for 
patentability.56 Because design patent law incorporates most of the legal 
rules applicable to utility patents—including a rule that generally grants 
priority to the first to file for a patent on a design57—inventors have an 
incentive to seek design patent protection expeditiously.58 As a result, the 
information in a design patent application is likely to be developed early in 
the commercialization timeline, frequently before competitors enter the 
 
51 Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]f other designs 
could produce the same or similar functional capabilities, the design of the article in question is 
likely ornamental, not functional.”). 
52 Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion’s Function, supra note 31, at 100 n.269; see also Mark P. McKenna 
& Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 520 (2017) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has, since its inception, considered the 
question of whether claimed features lack ornamentality more than thirty times. It has found the 
claimed design invalid on functionality grounds only five times, most recently in 2001.”). 
53 See, e.g., McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6, at 42 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s standards for 
nonobviousness in design patent law are relatively low, as compared to utility patent standards . . . . [T]he 
Federal Circuit’s approach comes dangerously close to collapsing obviousness and novelty altogether.”). 
54 35 U.S.C. § 173. 
55 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); accord Egyptian Goddess, Inc. 
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing, affirming, and applying 
the ordinary observer test). 
56 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 171; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504 (9th ed., rev. 8, Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP] (describing the 
examination of design patent applications); MATTHEW A. SMITH, DESIGN PATENTS 7 (0.9 ed. 
2012), http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2012/12/2012-12-17_design_patents.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SG45-FPMC] (noting the regulations that govern the form of patent applications). 
57 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
58 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Dynamic Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1720 (2016) 
[hereinafter Fromer, Dynamic Disclosure] (remarking that inventors prefer to file patent applications 
promptly “to avoid being blocked from getting a patent by a competing inventor”). In the context 
of utility patents, “there are marketplace pressures to rush to patent, in that patent applications and 
granted patents readily serve as signals to venture capitalists and other funders that the inventions 
at issue are a worthy business investment.” Id. Whether design patents also help attract outside 
funding is currently unknown as an empirical matter. 
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space. That means that a design patent claim will likely be made 
independently of any disputes with competitors that might arise down the 
line.59 Design patent applications are not published, so the PTO makes the 
claimed design public only once the patent issues,60 which occurs about 
twenty months from filing, on average.61 
Design patent applications, like applications for utility patents, must 
contain a sufficient “written description of the [design], and of the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms 
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and 
use the same.”62 The application must also “conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
inventor . . . regards as the [design].”63 
Yet because “[t]he design for an article consists of the visual characteristics 
embodied in or applied to an article [of manufacture],”64 a design patent 
application may include only a single claim for the design, and that claim 
must consist of a drawing.65 In essence, then, a design patent’s single claim is 
visual.66 The application must have a preamble, which includes the design’s 
title (which must “designate the particular article” of manufacture at issue) 
and “a brief description of the nature and intended use of the article in which 
the design is embodied.”67 But as the PTO makes clear, “[n]o description of 
the design in the specification beyond a brief description of the drawing is 
generally necessary, since as a rule the illustration in the drawing views is its 
 
59 That said, there might be opportunities to amend claims during patent prosecution to cover 
competitors’ products that have since emerged. See Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 
107, 115-16 (2016) [hereinafter Burstein, Costly Designs] (“The PTO also allows design patent 
applicants to broaden their claims . . . . [T]his strategy allows a design patent applicant to . . . 
capture competing products that were introduced after the first design patent application was filed—
even if those competing products did not infringe the original patent claim.”). 
60 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(iv). 
61 Robert C. MacKichan III, Despite Increased Hiring, Design Patent Application Backlog Builds, 
FINNEGAN: PROSECUTION FIRST BLOG (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/
blogs/prosecution-first/despite-increased-hiring-design-patent-application-backlog-builds.html 
[https://perma.cc/378C-NHGS]. 
62 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
63 Id. § 112(b). 
64 MPEP, supra note 56, § 1502. 
65 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.152–53(a) (2012). This is in contrast to utility patents, which can—and very 
often do—conclude with multiple verbal claims. MPEP, supra note 56, § 1502.01(C). 
66 MPEP, supra note 56, §§ 1503.01.II, 1504.04. 
67 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.153(a), 1.154(b)(1). The preamble is generally thought not to have any legal 
effect, and it is therefore unclear whether the depicted design is limited to the context suggested by 
the preamble language. Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161, 179-207 (2015). 
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own best description.”68 Thus, the drawing takes precedence over everything 
else in a design patent application.69 
A design patent claim can be directed to configuration or to surface 
ornamentation.70 Moreover, an applicant can claim the design of an entire 
object or specific features thereof.71 The scope of the claim is defined by what 
is drawn in solid lines.72 By contrast, broken lines are used to represent 
“[s]tructure that is not part of the claimed design, but is considered necessary 
to show the environment in which the design is associated.”73 Visual aspects 
depicted with broken lines are therefore unclaimed.74 Thus, in the drawing 
on the left in Figure 5, the claim is limited to certain design features of the 
upper portion of the boot; the shape of the button and the design of the lower 
part of the boot are not claimed. By contrast, the drawing on the right in 
Figure 5 is entirely in solid lines. It therefore reflects a claim to every aspect 
of the design of the multi-dimensional pocket tool. 
 
Figure 5: Drawings from Deckers’ Upper Boot Patent75 (Left) and a Utility 
Tool76 (Right) 
 
68 MPEP, supra note 56, § 1503.01.II. 
69 See id. §§ 1503-02 (“[T]he drawing or photograph constitutes the entire visual 
disclosure of the claim . . . .”). 
70 Id. § 1502 (identifying both configuration and surface ornamentation as design patent subject matter). 
71 See Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 59, at 114 (noting that a design patent applicant does 
not need to claim an “entire article of manufacture”). 
72 MPEP, supra note 56, § 1503.02.III ¶ 15.50 (requiring solid lines for the “ornamental design 
which is being claimed” and prohibiting broken lines even for “unimportant or immaterial features” 
so long as they are “portions of a claimed design”). 
73 Id. § 1503-02.III. 
74 Id. For further detail on the meaning of solid and broken lines in design patents, see Burstein, 
Costly Designs, supra note 59, at 114-16, which discusses priority determinations with regard to 
continuation applications when a solid line in an earlier application is later changed to a broken line. 
75 U.S. Patent D599,999 fig.2. 
76 U.S. Patent D707,091 fig.7. 
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Perhaps counterintuitively, depicting some aspects of the article in broken 
lines makes the claim broader rather than narrower. The drawing of the boot 
design above claims an upper portion of a boot with some sort of fastening 
device, but it covers use of those design features no matter the size or shape 
of the button and no matter the design of the lower part of the boot.77 Had 
the drawing depicted the boot entirely in solid lines, the shape and size of the 
button and the design of the lower portion of the boot would have been 
relevant constraints on the scope of the claim. 
Despite the overwhelming visual orientation of design patent claiming 
rules, images rarely speak for themselves, so verbal descriptions of claimed 
designs feature prominently in design patent litigation.78 Yet the formal role 
of verbal description is quite unclear. 
In virtually every doctrinal context, courts insist that excessive reliance 
on verbal description should be avoided because of “the risk of placing undue 
emphasis on particular features of the design and the risk that a finder of fact 
will focus on each individual described feature in the verbal description rather 
than on the design as a whole.”79 The Federal Circuit has thus repeatedly 
underscored that “a design is better represented by an illustration than it 
could be by any description and a description would probably not be 
intelligible without the illustration.”80 
Nevertheless, despite courts’ general disfavor of verbal description, it 
turns out to be impossible to avoid. Courts cannot evaluate the validity of a 
claimed design without identifying and describing aspects of the design and 
comparing them to features of prior art designs. Nor can they assess 
infringement without describing similarities and dissimilarities between 
 
77 MPEP, supra note 56, § 1503.02.III ¶ 15.50.01 (“Environmental structure may be illustrated 
by broken lines in the drawing . . . .”). 
78 See Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images in Design Patents, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 409, 418 (2012) [hereinafter Tushnet, The Eye Alone] (explaining that although the Federal Circuit 
“endorsed the idea that the images should be allowed to speak for themselves,” courts use verbal 
description where juries “would not know how to interpret without [verbal] instruction”). 
79 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 680 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
80 Id. at 679 (quoting Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Nonobviousness is an outlier on this issue because in that context a court’s failure 
to reduce the design to verbal description is error. See High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, 
Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court described the design at “too 
high a level of abstraction,” and remanding for the district court to “add sufficient detail to its verbal 
description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image consonant with that design”); Apple, Inc. 
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329-33 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (concluding that the district court 
viewed the references in the obviousness context “from too high a level of abstraction”); cf. MRC 
Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that even though 
“the district court did not expressly undertake to translate the claimed design into a verbal 
description,” that did not constitute error because “[i]t [was] entirely clear from the district court’s 
opinion what it considered to be the relevant design characteristics of the . . . patented design”). 
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features of the accused product and those of the claimed design. Thus, while 
courts often cling to the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that descriptions are not 
intelligible without the accompanying illustrations, the cases demonstrate 
that the opposite is about as true: design patent drawings may not be 
intelligible without some description. 
Take, for example, the Federal Circuit’s discussion of novelty in a case 
involving foam clogs sold under the Crocs brand name.81 In that case, the 
court emphasized that the claimed design should be compared to a prior art 
reference holistically, without focusing on individual design elements 
described in words.82 But the court then proceeded to identify and highlight 
particular design features (shown in Figure 6) and compare them to features 
of a prior art reference, concluding that the differences may be significant: 
The Crocs ’789 patent, as shown . . . in the figure on the left, contains a long, 
U-shaped dimpling pattern on the insole. In contrast, the patents-in-suit 
[including the ’263 patent] . . . have a dimpling pattern that includes multiple 
short rows of dimples. Because we cannot say that these differences are 
insignificant as a matter of law, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether the designs would be viewed as substantially similar in the eyes of 
the ordinary observer armed with the knowledge of the prior art.83 
Figure 6: Croc Design Patent Claim84 
Figure 6 in the ’789 Patent Figure 1 in the ’789 Patent 
 
Figure 6 in the ’263 Patent Figure 2 in the ’263 Patent 
 
 
81 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237-41 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
82 Id. at 1240 (“[A]pplying the point of novelty test in the context of anticipation . . . creates 
the need to canvass the entire prior art to identify the points of novelty.”). 
83 Id. at 1242-43. 
84 Id. at 1236-1237, 1342. 
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At the same time, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that 
“[s]light variations on the number and position of the circular holes on top of 
the shoe, the rectangular holes on the toe of the shoe as well as the design of 
different shaped rectangles on the sole of the shoe” were insufficient to 
preclude a finding of lack of novelty because they did not change the overall 
visual impression of the shoe.85 
Given the tight relationship between novelty and infringement 
standards,86 it should be no surprise that courts are similarly conflicted about 
verbal description of the visual claim in the infringement context. Under 
Gorham Co. v. White’s canonical infringement test, an accused design is 
infringing when it is “substantially the same” as the claimed design such that 
the ordinary observer would be deceived into buying the accused design 
believing it to be the claimed design.87 Courts are supposed to make this 
assessment of similarity holistically. Indeed, the Court emphasized the 
ordinary-observer perspective because it believed that experts would fixate on 
differences and therefore be reluctant to find infringement.88 Nevertheless, 
the Court proceeded to identify and describe similarities and differences 
between the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s silverware designs in 284 words of 
intricate detail before concluding that the differences were insignificant.89 
In its more recent en banc decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 
the Federal Circuit emphasized that the ordinary observer should assess 
 
85 Id. at 1243. For another example of courts’ split personality with regard to verbal descriptions 
of design patents, this time in the context of assessing ornamentality, see PHG Techs., LLC v. St. 
John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1363-68 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
86 Int’l Seaway Trading, 589 F.3d at 1240 (“[T]he same tests must be applied to 
infringement and anticipation . . . .”). 
87 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). Until 2008, courts often supplemented the Gorham 
infringement standard for design patents with a “point of novelty” inquiry. Under this inquiry, the 
court was required to identify the features in the claimed design that made the design patentable 
over the prior art so as to focus the comparison between the accused product and the patented design 
on the presence or absence of those features. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1253 (2011) [hereinafter Lemley, Point of Novelty] (describing this test, and analyzing when 
assessment of the point of novelty is and is not appropriate in patent law). That approach did not 
require courts to offer a complete verbal description of the claimed design, but it did require 
identification and verbal description of the features that constituted the point of novelty. Indeed, 
the whole idea of the point of novelty test was to draw attention to those features in order to 
determine if they were present in the accused product. The Federal Circuit rejected the point of 
novelty test in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
88 Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 528 (“Experts, therefore, are not the persons to be deceived 
. . . . [Ordinary observers] are the principal purchasers of the articles to which designs have given 
novel appearances, and if they are misled, and induced to purchase what is not the article they 
supposed it to be, . . . the patentees are injured.”). 
89 Id. at 529-31. 
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similarity in light of the prior art, and it gave lower courts latitude to describe 
the designs verbally.90 According to the Federal Circuit, “a court may find it 
helpful to point out, either for a jury or in the case of a bench trial by way of 
describing the court’s own analysis, various features of the claimed design as 
they relate to the accused design and the prior art,” and as a result, a district 
court’s “relatively detailed claim construction will not be reversible error.”91 
Indeed, in another case the Federal Circuit approved a district court’s claim 
construction that filtered out a hammer design’s unprotectable functional 
aspects before comparing the accused product to the patented design, rather 
than merely comparing the hammer designs holistically.92 
There are at least two related reasons for courts’ frequent verbal 
descriptions of designs notwithstanding doctrinal rules that purport to 
elevate the design patent drawings above all else. First, many design patent 
validity and infringement doctrines require analysis of particular design 
features, and application of those doctrines encourages—if it doesn’t 
implicitly demand—verbal elaboration. In particular, despite their 
legitimate concerns about disaggregation leading decisionmakers to 
undervalue a design’s overall creativity, courts must also appropriately 
define the scope of a party’s rights in the design, and they cannot do that 
without accounting in some way for unprotectable features.93 Second, 
courts have to offer reasons for their rulings, and they feel at home in words 
and much less so in pictures.94 
 
90 543 F.3d at 665. 
91 Id. at 679-80. 
92 Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Later decisions, 
however, have faulted lower courts for eliminating such features, suggesting that lower courts can 
highlight functional features but cannot fully filter them out. See, e.g., Sports Dimension, Inc. v. 
Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (rejecting the district court’s claim 
construction for filtering out functional aspects of a design for a personal flotation device despite 
those aspects being functional and despite emphasizing that the functional aspects cannot form 
any part of the claim scope); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (agreeing that the “trigger, torque knob, and activation button elements of the 
[claimed surgical instrument] have functional aspects,” but holding that “the district court’s 
construction of the Design Patents . . . hav[ing] no scope whatsoever fails to account for the 
particular ornamentation of the claimed design”). 
93 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 
717-19 (2012) [hereinafter Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words] (making a similar observation about courts’ 
treatment of visual works under copyright law). 
94 See, e.g., MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(emphasizing that “the purpose of requiring district courts to describe the claimed design in words 
is so that the parties and appellate courts can discern the trial court’s reasoning in identifying a 
primary reference” for assessing nonobviousness); infra subsection II.B.3; cf. Tushnet, The Eye Alone, 
supra note 78, at 417 (“The written description does at least attempt to create a reviewable record 
and to ask questions that can sometimes be answered on summary judgment. As with copyright 
infringement, the ordinary observer test makes design patent infringement findings harder to review 
and analyze; as gestalts, they are difficult to dissect.”). 
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A pervasive level-of-generality issue further complicates the role of verbal 
description. Consider, for example, a recent case involving a patented slipper 
design in which the Federal Circuit criticized the district court for 
characterizing the design as one for “slippers with an opening for a foot that 
can contain a fuzzy (fleece) lining and have a smooth outer surface.”95 
According to the Federal Circuit, that description, which was to be used in 
assessing nonobviousness, “represent[ed] too high a level of abstraction by 
failing to focus on the distinctive visual appearances of . . . the claimed 
design.”96 Specifically, the district court failed to “add sufficient detail to its 
verbal description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image consonant 
with th[e claimed] design,”97 pictured in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Slipper Design Patent Claim98 
 
 
95 High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
96 Id. (quoting Apple v. Samsung, 678 F.3d 1314, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (ruling similarly with 
respect to a district court’s description of an iPad design patent as “a rectangular tablet with four 
evenly rounded corners and a flat back”)). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1305. 
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In another case, however, the Federal Circuit accepted the level of 
generality at which the district court described the similarities and differences 
between the claimed design of a football jersey for dogs and the purported 
primary prior art reference, depicted in Figure 8.99 The district court had 
identified three differences: “(1) the patented design has a V-neck collar where 
the Eagles jersey has a round neck; (2) the patented design contains an 
interlock fabric panel on the side portion of the design rather than mesh; and 
(3) the patented design contains additional ornamental surge stitching on the 
rear portion of the jersey.”100 In terms of similarity, the district court 
emphasized that both designs have “an opening at the collar portion for the 
head, two openings and sleeves stitched to the body of the jersey for limbs, 
and a body portion on which a football logo is applied.”101 Likewise, “the 
Eagles jersey is made ‘primarily of a mesh and interlock fabric,’” and “it 
contains at least some ornamental surge stitching,” both elements found in 
the prior art reference.102 
 
Figure 8: Design Patent Claim for Football Jersey for Dogs and Eagles 
Jersey Primary Reference103 
 
99 MRC Innovations, 747 F.3d at 1332. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1333. 
102 Id. Notably, the Federal Circuit thought that, in light of the district court’s description of 
similarities and differences, its failure to translate the claimed design into a verbal description was 
excusable. Id. at 1332. 
103 Id. at 1328-30. 
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Why was the district court’s description of the differences between the 
designs in the latter case appropriate, while the court’s description in the 
former case was “at too high a level of generality”? No principles are evident. 
Three key features of design patent claiming emerge from this review. First, 
with regard to timing, designs are claimed in the design patent application, 
typically prior to and independently of any disputes with potential infringers. 
In fact, design patent claims can become public, upon patent issuance, even 
before the patentee’s associated product arrives on the market.104 
Second, the scope of design patent rights is, at least formally, determined 
by the design patent drawings. Those drawings set out both claimed and 
unclaimed matter by use of solid and broken lines, respectively. Despite 
design patent law’s emphasis on visual claims over verbal descriptions, case 
law makes clear that verbal description plays an inescapable role in design 
patent jurisprudence. The role of verbal description, however, is seriously 
complicated by the unpredictability of the level of generality at which a visual 
claim should be described. 
Third, design patent claims are best categorized as central claims by 
exemplar. In previous work, one of us proposed that claims to intellectual 
property can be classified along two dimensions: peripheral versus central, and 
by characteristic versus by exemplar.105 Peripheral claiming entails delineating 
the metes and bounds of the set of protected creations, while central claiming 
involves setting out some—but not necessarily all—members of that set.106 
Claiming by characteristic “requires a description of the essential properties 
of the set’s members,” whereas claiming by exemplar “entails enumerating 
particular members of the set of protected embodiments.”107 
Because design patent claims are principally visual and singular rather 
than comprised of verbal lists of design characteristics, those claims are by 
 
104 In fact, there are websites dedicated to reporting on industries’ or companies’ issued design patents, 
sometimes for products that have not yet appeared on the market. See, e.g., Apple Was Granted 4 Design Patents 
Today Covering HomePod, an Apple Store Room and More, PATENTLY APPLE (Mar. 13, 2018), http://
www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2018/03/apple-was-granted-4-design-patents-today-covering-
homepod-an-apple-store-room-and-more.html [https://perma.cc/PKS7-G9HZ] (revealing Apple designs for 
a retail space, home speaker, laptop device, and charger); Apple Wins Design Patents for Chicago’s Newest Apple 
Store and a MacBook with Back Edge USB-C Port, PATENTLY APPLE (Sept. 12, 2017), http://
www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2017/09/apple-wins-design-patents-for-chicagos-newest-apple-store-
and-a-macbook-with-back-edge-usb-c-port.html [https://perma.cc/TMC7-8N7Z] (reporting on the design 
patent granted to Apple for its storefront in Chicago, among others). 
105 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 724-30; cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or 
Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1783-87 (2009) [hereinafter Burk 
& Lemley, Fence Posts] (exploring peripheral versus central claiming with regard to utility patents). 
106 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 726-27. 
107 Id. at 727. 
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exemplar. That is, one must determine the design’s important features or 
characteristics from the design’s visual depiction. 
It might seem that design patent claims are peripheral because the 
designer drafts her claim to demarcate the bounds of her creation and patent 
infringement is determined by reference to that claim.108 But in light of the 
infringement standard, the precise contours of a design patent claim do not 
strictly limit the scope of a party’s rights. Under Gorham, an accused design 
infringes a patented design if “an ordinary observer, giving such attention as 
a purchaser usually gives, [would find the] two designs . . . substantially the 
same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him 
to purchase one supposing it to be the other.”109 That test permits factfinders 
to find infringement when features depicted in the design patent claim are 
absent from the defendant’s design, or when features absent from the design 
patent claim are present in the defendant’s design, so long as the defendant’s 
product is similar enough to the claimed design that an ordinary observer 
would deem them substantially the same.110 Therefore, we think design patent 
claims are better categorized as central rather than peripheral claims. 
These features of design patent claiming are distinctive. We return to how 
these features affect the design patent regime after describing how parties 
claim design in trademark law and copyright law. 
B. Trade Dress Claiming 
Product design and product packaging are protectable as trade dress, 
which, under modern law, is a species of trademarks.111 Unlike design patent 
rights, trademark rights arise through use rather than registration.112 Thus, 
while the Lanham Act creates procedures for federal registration of marks,113 
 
108 Cf. Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 105, at 1744-46 (analyzing utility patent law as 
having peripheral claiming); Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 721-23 (same). 
109 See supra text accompanying note 87. 
110 Design patent jurisprudence further confirms that claims are central. In one case involving 
two design patents, one for a windshield design with four holes and one for one with no holes, the 
Federal Circuit ruled that “[c]laiming different designs does not necessarily suggest that the 
territory between those designs [here, windshield designs with one to three holes,] is also claimed.” 
Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Yet, 
the court continued, the design patents might cover three-holed windshield designs if they are 
sufficiently similar. See id. at 705. 
111 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209-16 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773-74 (1992). 
112 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 16:18 (5th ed. 2018) (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017)). 
113 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
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unregistered marks are enforceable under federal law on substantially the 
same terms as registered marks.114 
Like all trademarks, to be protectable, trade dress must be used in 
commerce in a way that “identif[ies] and distinguish[es] [a party’s goods] 
from those manufactured or sold by others and . . . indicate[s] the source of 
the goods, even if that source is unknown.”115 As we noted above, product 
packaging is capable of being considered inherently distinctive, but product 
design is only protectable if it has acquired secondary meaning.116 Moreover, 
trade dress features are not protectable to the extent they are functional, 
meaning they are “essential to the use or purpose of the article or . . . affect[] 
the cost or quality of the article.”117 
There are several distinguishing features of trademark claiming. One is a 
function of the fact that trademark rights are not rights in gross; that is, those 
rights exist only in relation to the goods or services with which they are 
used.118 While trademark rights may be enforced against a somewhat broader 
range of uses, the rights remain anchored by the claimant’s use.119 As a result, 
unlike patent rights, trademark claims are two dimensional: a party claims a 
particular trademark in relation to particular goods or services. 
Both of those dimensions matter because the scope of a party’s trademark 
rights is determined by assessment of likelihood of confusion through a 
multifactor test that measures both the similarity of the marks at issue and 
the similarity of the goods.120 Even in cases involving identical goods, use of 
a mark does not infringe if it is sufficiently dissimilar from the plaintiff ’s 
 
114 See id. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Indeed, many (perhaps most) trademarks are not registered. Barton 
Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark 
Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 961-62 (2018). 
115 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Likewise, under a more recent addition to the law, they are protectable if 
a person has a “bona fide intention to use [them] in commerce and applies to register [them] on the 
principal register established by [federal law].” Id. 
116 Supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
117 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
118 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(emphasizing that classification is product specific, and that “a term that is in one category for a 
particular product may be in quite a different one for another,” using the example of Ivory, which 
“would be generic when used to describe a product made from the tusks of elephants but arbitrary 
as applied to soap”). 
119 See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark 
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 909 (2017) [hereinafter Tushnet, Registering Disagreement] (noting 
that although registration requires careful identification of the specimen on which the registrant 
is using the trademark, trademark rights are not necessarily limited to the goods or services for 
which the mark is registered). 
120 Each circuit has its own multifactor test. The tests overlap substantially, however, and all 
of them consider the similarity of the parties’ marks and the similarity of goods, among other factors. 
See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad 
Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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mark.121 Nor is use of an identical mark necessarily infringing if it is for 
distinct goods or services.122 For example, PANDORA for internet radio can 
coexist with PANDORA for jewelry.123 That kind of coexistence is not the 
exception but the rule, and the list of coexisting marks could be expanded 
dramatically if we included marks with the same dominant portion and 
different generic or descriptive additions: DELTA DENTAL, DELTA 
FAUCET, and DELTA AIRLINES; and APPLE COMPUTERS, APPLE 
RECORDS, and APPLE VACATIONS.124 
Two other distinguishing features of trademark claiming—relating to the 
timing and format of claims—are consequences of the fact that federal law 
protects both registered and unregistered marks.125 In terms of timing, for 
marks that are registered, the particular form of the mark must be claimed in 
the application, likely independent of any particular dispute with an alleged 
infringer.126 Unregistered marks, on the other hand, are never formally 
claimed in any fixed format and ultimately are defined for purposes of an 
assertion of rights, and then perhaps not even fully. 
That timing difference affects the format of claims, as the PTO has 
developed detailed and extensive rules governing the depiction of a mark in 
a trademark application.127 Specifically, the PTO requires applicants to 
include a verbal description of the mark when the claimed mark (1) contains 
a design element; (2) is three dimensional or a configuration of goods or 
packaging; (3) includes broken lines to show position or placement or to 
indicate that a portion of the product or packaging is not part of the mark; or 
(4) includes color.128 These verbal descriptions must be quite detailed. 
Indeed, the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure suggests the 
 
121 See Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark Law 
Protect the Strong More Than the Weak?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1356-60 (2017) (classifying 
doctrine in this regard). 
122 See id. at 1357 (“The hard cases . . . arise . . . where the facts present similar marks or 
competing (or related) goods.”). 
123 PANDORA, Registration No. 3,173,558; PANDORA, Registration No. 3,613,181. 
124 E.g., DELTA DENTAL, Registration No. 1,760,270; DELTA AIR LINES, Registration 
No. 970,418; DELTA, Registration No. 2,583,761; APPLE, Registration No. 1,078,312 
(registering Apple for computers and computer programs); APPLE VACATIONS, Registration 
No. 1,462,268 (listing goods and services as travel agency services). 
125 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2) (2012) (requiring, as part of the application to register, “a drawing 
of the mark” and a specification of “the goods in connection with which the mark is used”); id. 
§ 1052(b)(2) (requiring a drawing and a description of the goods in connection with which a party 
has a bona fide intention to use a mark). 
127 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE §§ 807–08 (8th ed. Oct. 2017) [hereinafter TMEP]. 
128 Id. § 808.01. 
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following very long and excruciatingly detailed description of the stylized 
mark depicted in Figure 9: 
 
Figure 9: Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure Exemplary 
Trademark129 
The mark consists of a red background; the stylized word “HOSPITAL” in 
white letters outlined in black with the letter “S” in the form of a dollar sign 
and letter “L” in the form of a cast; a man with red hair in a green gown with 
an orange and silver stethoscope and silver headband mirror; man wearing a 
blue cap, gown and mask with silver scissors; silver medical tree with white, 
pink, and gold intravenous pouch, fluid and tube; gray and gold crutch; nurse 
with yellow hair wearing pink clothing and brown clip board; orange and 
black scale with an orange man wearing purple pants and orange robe; nurse 
with yellow hair and white clothing pushing a wheelchair with a man in green 
clothing with white cast and gold cane; white and blue bed pan; yellow and 
black buildings and white signs with stylized words “EMERGENCY 
HOSPITAL” in black, and green vegetation; white and pink emergency 
vehicle with purple tires; a green air tank, orange stretcher, green golf club 
bag with white balls and pink clubs; nurse with yellow hair and blue clothing 
holding a white syringe with pink fluid; and an orange man dressed in blue 
with a white and red thermometer.130 
Despite this formal requirement, many registrations of trade dress lack 
any meaningful verbal description. As an example, consider the registration 
of the iconic Coca-Cola bottle design, shown below in Figure 10. The 
registration depicts the bottle, but it includes only the meager description 
that “the mark consists of the three-dimensional configuration of the 
distinctive bottle as shown.”131 
 
129 Id. § 808.02. 
130 Id. 
131 Registration No. 1,057,884. 
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Figure 10: Registered Coca-Cola Bottle Design132 
 
In addition to rules regarding the form of the mark depicted in the 
application and verbal descriptions, use-based applications must be 
accompanied by a specimen of use, and that specimen must demonstrate use 
of the mark for which registration is sought.133 That requirement is supposed 
to assure a reasonably tight relationship between registration and use because 
the applicant must show that it is actually making use of the mark for which 
it seeks registration and is not merely trying to reserve the mark.134 
An application to register a mark typically claims the mark independently 
of any particular dispute. While the form of the mark for which registration 
is sought is strategic in the sense that, to the extent possible, the applicant 
depicts and describes the mark so as to capture anticipated variations that the 
applicant would regard as infringing, it is nearly impossible for an applicant 
to claim with the full range of potential uses in mind. 
Registered marks stand in sharp contrast to unregistered ones, which are 
never formally claimed before a dispute. Obviously, unregistered marks are 
used in some particular format, so the use itself provides a kernel of notice as 
to the scope of a party’s rights. But that notice can be highly imperfect, 
particularly in the context of composite marks (ones with many components), 
 
132 Id. 
133 TMEP, supra note 127, § 904. The same is ultimately true of applications based on intent 
to use because those applications will have to be supported by a statement of use and a specimen 
reflecting use of the mark in the format for which registration was sought. Id. §§ 1104, 1109. 
134 Yet a party need not always submit a specimen showing use of the mark in the identical form 
for which registration is sought. Standard-character marks are understood to encompass all stylizations 
of the mark. Id. § 1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, if a party applies to register the mark in standard-character form, 
use of that word mark in any format will support the application. Applications to register marks in 
stylized form, however, must be supported by specimens showing use of the mark in that form. Id. 
§ 807.04(b). That constraint operates even more powerfully on product packaging and design, for which 
there is no real analogy to the standard-character mark. There is less flexibility along the goods and 
services dimension because the specimen must show use in relation to the claimed goods and services. 
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a category that would include most trade dress. Two Pesos135 is illustrative 
here: because Taco Cabana was not required to claim its trade dress 
independently of its dispute with Two Pesos, it would have been difficult to 
tell before the dispute whether color was an important part of the “not 
formally claimed” restaurant design. This problem is especially serious in the 
context of design because protectable designs may include many features that 
are unprotectable on their own but are protectable as part of the composite.136 
It is therefore often difficult to determine which features are important in 
defining the scope of a party’s rights.137 
This notice problem persists even for registered marks because it turns out 
that, despite the intricate rules governing a mark’s description in a trademark 
application, the specific form of the registration is mostly unimportant at the 
infringement stage. While the existence of a registration confers a presumption 
of validity, courts evaluating likelihood of confusion rarely pay attention to the 
form of registration, or even to the identified goods or services.138 Instead, courts 
focus on consumer understanding of a mark as used in the marketplace because 
consumer understanding is more relevant to potential consumer confusion.139 
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc.140 is 
the exception that proves the rule. In that well-known case, Christian 
Louboutin objected to Yves Saint Laurent’s use of a red-lacquered sole on its 
monochromatic red shoes.141 Louboutin owned a registration for “a red 
lacquered outsole on footwear,” as depicted in Figure 11.142 Louboutin’s 
description made clear that “the dotted lines [were] not part of the mark but 
[were] intended only to show placement of the mark.”143 
 
 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 8–14. 
136 See Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 527 (6th Cir. 
2013) (noting the problem of “overall appearance” in the context of protectable trade dress); AmBrit, 
Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535-37 (11th Cir. 1986) (demonstrating that colors like royal blue and 
materials like silver foil, although not individually protectable, may be protectable as a composite); 
Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (reiterating 
that while each element of trade dress individually may lack distinctiveness, the combination of 
elements may be sufficiently distinctive to merit protection); Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & 
Glenn L. Christensen, An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1048-49 (2009) (arguing that “even for the highly stylized mark, the composite 
mark doctrine affords protection only for the design, not for the underlying descriptive word(s)”). 
137 For a general discussion of the problem of determining the scope of a mark owner’s rights 
when the mark at issue includes unprotectable matter, see Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28. 
138 See Tushnet, Registering Disagreement, supra note 119, at 909 (citing relevant cases). 
139 Id. 
140 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
141 Id. at 213. 
142 Registration No. 3,361,597. 
143 Id. 
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Figure 11: Illustration from Christian Louboutin Trademark Registration144 
 
Rather than emphasizing the form of the registration (which notably did 
not explicitly limit the mark to a contrasting red sole), the Second Circuit 
focused on Louboutin’s actual advertising and use, which it believed 
demonstrated that secondary meaning existed only with respect to red-
lacquered soles on shoes in a contrasting color.145 Indeed, rather than defining 
Louboutin’s rights by reference to the form of its registration, the court 
ordered the PTO to amend the registration to make it conform to consumer 
understanding.146 As a consequence, the corrected registration now describes 
the mark as “consist[ing] of a red lacquered outsole on footwear that contrasts 
with the color of the adjoining (‘upper’) portion of the shoe” (though the 
broader original illustration remains).147 
Even after the Second Circuit’s decision, the precise scope of Louboutin’s 
rights with regard to red-lacquered soles remains underspecified. It’s not only 
 
144 Id. 
145 Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227-28. 
146 Id. at 228. 
147 Registration No. 3,361,597. Christian Louboutin’s ability to obtain rights in its red-lacquered 
soles has been contested, sometimes successfully, in other jurisdictions. Compare Christian Louboutin’s 
Red Sole Is Not a Valid Trademark in India, FASHION LAW, (July 18, 2018), 
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/christian-louboutins-red-sole-is-not-a-valid-trademark-in-india 
[https://perma.cc/7KMK-NDDT] (reporting on the High Court of Delhi’s judgment against 
Louboutin), with Eleonora Rosati, BREAKING: CJEU Rules that Louboutin Red Sole Mark Does NOT 
Fall Within Absolute Ground for Refusal, IPKAT, June 12, 2018, http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/
2018/06/breaking-cjeu-rules-that-louboutin-red.html [https://perma.cc/QLW5-AVV4] (noting that 
the European Union’s Court of Justice held that “a mark consisting of a colour applied to the sole of a 
shoe is not covered by the prohibition of the registration of shapes”). 
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that consumer perceptions can change over time such that rights dependent 
on secondary meaning can evolve, but also that legal actors decide scope 
iteratively in the context of particular disputes. For purposes of resolving 
Louboutin’s claim against Yves Saint Laurent, the court needed to determine 
Louboutin’s rights only as against monochromatic women’s pumps with a red-
lacquered sole. It could do that by emphasizing one particular aspect of 
Louboutin’s mark: that the sole contrasts with the upper part of the shoe.148 
But, of course, that leaves unanswered questions regarding Louboutin’s rights 
with respect to use of red-lacquered soles on women’s flat shoes or men’s shoes 
with a contrasting upper, even though Louboutin also sells both types of 
shoes.149 Louboutin’s registration is itself ambiguous; it claims the mark for 
“women’s high fashion designer footwear,” which would seem to cover flat 
shoes, but the drawing depicts a pump (albeit with broken lines).150 
 
Figure 12: Christian Louboutin Greggo Flat Shoe151 
 
148 Notably, it is not even clear why the court was so confident that emphasizing the contrasting 
upper was sufficient to resolve the case without a likelihood-of-confusion analysis. Christian 
Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228. Infringement does not require use of an identical mark. See, e.g., 
Streamline Prod. Sys., Inc. v. Streamline Mfg., Inc., 851 F.3d 440, 454 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that 
“the more similar the marks, the greater likelihood of confusion,” though the marks may be 
distinguishable). Therefore, even if the Louboutin mark was properly limited to contrasting red 
soles, use of a red sole in other contexts could still be infringing. The Second Circuit did not even 
contemplate this possibility. 
149 An example of the latter is shown in Figure 12. 
150 Registration No. 3,361,597. 
151 Greggo Flat, CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN, http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/shop/men/
greggo-flat.html [https://perma.cc/J5X5-6GZ9] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
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These questions are far from academic, as other designers have used red on 
various shoe components that are arguably infringing, as shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Stuart Weitzman Women’s Shoe (Left) and Burberry “Splash 
Sole” (Right)152 
 
 
 
Courts have often demonstrated sensitivity to notice concerns in cases 
involving unregistered trade dress and have therefore required trade dress 
claimants to describe their trade dress verbally, usually in the complaint.153 
Images alone are routinely deemed insufficient,154 and even combinations of 
 
152 Shoes, FASHION CAPE, http://thefashioncape.com/gallery_categories/shoes/ [https://perma.cc/
L4RD-6B6U] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018); Burberry Splash Sole Shoes in Bordeaux, LYST, 
https://www.lyst.com/shoes/burberry-splash-sole-shoes-bordeaux/ [https://perma.cc/GA3N-XS4C] (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
153 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that the elements of the trade dress should be identified); Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 
754, 768 (6th Cir. 2005) (“To recover for trade-dress infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, a party must first identify what particular elements or attributes comprise the protectable 
trade dress.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 634 
(6th Cir. 2002) (requiring that the elements of the trade dress be identified separately). But see 
Invisaflow, LLC v. Euramax Int’l, Inc., No. 14-3026, 2015 WL 11562084, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 
2015) (finding that the Eleventh Circuit does not impose a verbal-articulation requirement, but 
that the plaintiff ’s description would have sufficed under the Second Circuit’s more difficult 
standard); Kee Action Sports LLC v. Valken, Inc., No. 12-6069, 2013 WL 6633439, at *5-7 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 17, 2013) (stating that the Third Circuit does not require verbal description and finding that 
the plaintiff “sufficiently pled the nature of the claimed trade dress to satisfy the notice 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8”). 
154 See, e.g., Tracey Tooker & TT Ltd., Inc. v. Whitworth, 212 F. Supp. 3d 429, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (“Although Tooker has submitted numerous photos of her hats, the Court cannot distill the 
distinctive elements of [Tooker]’s trade dress from a collection of photos.”); Oban US, LLC v. 
Nautilus, Inc., No. 13-1076, 2014 WL 2854539, at *9 (D. Conn. June 23, 2014) (“[T]he mere 
attachment of brochures [and] photographs . . . to the Amended Complaint is not sufficient, as 
courts cannot be expected to distill from a set of images those elements that are common to a line 
2018] Claiming Design 155 
images and verbal descriptions are often not enough if they do not collectively 
identify the protectable elements of the trade dress.155 
There is, however, no consistency regarding the level of generality at which 
courts enforce this requirement. In Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade 
Co.,156 the Second Circuit rejected as too abstract a description of site furniture 
that “incorporates large three-inch tubing, with a powdered cosmetic finish, 
bent in gentle turns that roll around the perimeter of the furniture which in 
combination with the various seating surfaces gives the viewer a floating or 
suspended feeling.”157 This description and various statements by Landscape’s 
witnesses “fail[ed] to indicate what unique combination of features ma[de] the 
trade dress of the ten items in the Petoskey line inherently distinctive.”158 
According to the court, “[a] claim for site furniture which is at once massive, 
yet appears to float, is too abstract to qualify as trade dress . . . . If the law 
protected style at such a level of abstraction, Braque might have prevented 
Picasso from selling cubist paintings in the United States.”159 
 In Premium Balloon Accessories, Inc. v. Creative Balloons Mfg., Inc.,160 
however, the Sixth Circuit accepted Premium’s description of its balloon 
weight trade dress because “Premium provided pictorial representations of 
its trade dress and emphasized the weight (80-100 grams), shape (five-pointed 
star), colors (primary), and size of its weight, among other factors.”161 Though 
 
of products and both distinctive and nonfunctional.” (internal quotations omitted)); Weber-Stephen 
Prods. LLC v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 13-1686, 2013 WL 5782433, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2013) 
(“Weber’s cited cases . . . do not support its position that including pictures of its grills in its 
complaint, without detailed description, is enough.”); Heller Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., No. 
09 Civ.1909 (JGK), 2009 WL 2486054, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009) (“[I]mages alone do not satisfy 
the plaintiff ’s obligation to articulate the distinctive features of the trade dress.”). In some cases, 
parties do not even attempt to identify the particular features of their trade dress but simply refer 
to images in a design patent and gesture vaguely at the existence of a trade dress. See, e.g., Original 
Complaint at 1, 3, Snap-On Inc. v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 16-1265 (E.D. Wis. Sept 21, 
2016) (demonstrating that the plaintiff attached images of their product but failed to explicitly 
describe the trade dress). 
155 See, e.g., Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, No. 14–03954, 2014 WL 
6892141, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) (“Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently described their 
trade dress because they have provided a photograph . . . and have provided a written description 
. . . . This description and the photograph alone do not sufficiently identify the particular elements 
of the packaging they seek to protect.”); Mike Vaughn Custom Sports, Inc. v. Piku, 15 F. Supp. 3d 
735, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“[T]he description of the graphics describe the design as functional . . . . 
The Court cannot evaluate what the plaintiff considers non-functional if the only factual allegations 
describe the product design’s myriad functional purposes . . . . The images do not rescue plaintiff ’s 
trade dress claim . . . .”).  
156 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997). 
157 Id. at 381. 
158 Id. at 381-82. 
159 Id. at 382. 
160 573 F. App’x 547 (6th Cir. 2014). 
161 Id. at 553. 
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the court acknowledged that “Premium’s articulation of its trade dress could 
have been more precise—for example, Premium should have stated the size 
of its weight,” it found the description adequate.162 
In other cases, courts have accepted the plaintiffs’ descriptions without 
discussion163 or have crafted their own descriptions based on the evidence 
presented.164 One consequence of this inconsistency is that, despite courts’ 
motivation to improve notice, the descriptions parties offer frequently do not 
meaningfully identify the protectable features of the trade dress.165 That can be 
true even when the description is long because length doesn’t always 
correspond to specificity; indeed, parties often use length to disguise generality. 
Here, for example, is Yeti’s very long, but extremely general, description of its 
trade dress in its complaint against Blackbird Products Group: 
YETI’s trade dress rights in the designs and appearances of the Roadie® 
and Tundra® coolers include, but are not limited to, the visual flow of the 
Tundra® and Roadie® coolers, the curves and lines in the Tundra® and 
Roadie® coolers, the design, style, and appearance of these curves and lines 
in the Tundra® and Roadie® coolers, the visual connection and relationship 
between one or more of the curves and lines in the Tundra® and Roadie® 
coolers, and the style, design, and appearance of one or more design aspects 
of the Tundra® and Roadie® coolers, including but not limited to the design 
and appearance of the style line on the front of the cooler; the design and 
appearance of the style line on the back of the cooler; the design and 
appearance of the style line on each side of the cooler; the design and 
appearance of the “duck-bill” tapered front corners of the cooler; the design 
and appearance of the inverted style line above the name plate and below 
the lid; the design and appearance of the ledge around the perimeter of the 
cooler; the design and appearance of the rope handles, the design and 
appearance of the front, side and rear design of the feet of the cooler; the 
placement, design and appearance of the slots on the side, front and rear of 
the cooler; the design and appearance of the latches; the design and 
appearance of the name plate and name plate lettering; the placement, 
 
162 Id. 
163 See, e.g., Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 503 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (noting the trade dress at issue without further elaboration); Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz 
GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 354-56 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). 
164 See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting the district 
court’s characterization of the trade dress of a Klondike Bar wrapper based on the evidence). 
165 Cf. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 117 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “a 
plaintiff ’s inability to explain to a court exactly which aspects of its product design(s) merit 
protection may indicate that its claim is pitched at an improper level of generality, i.e., the claimant 
seeks protection for an unprotectible style, theme or idea” (quoting Landscape Forms, Inc. v. 
Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997))). 
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design, and appearance of the name plate on the front between the two 
front style lines; and the color contrast, color combinations, and shapes of 
features of the cooler, whether these elements are alone or in any 
combination with each other, including the overall look and appearance of 
the Roadie® and Tundra® coolers.166 
The verbal-description requirement might constrain parties’ claiming in 
some cases because a party that claims too broadly risks describing a trade 
dress for which it will have trouble satisfying trademark law’s 
distinctiveness167 and nonfunctionality requirements.168 Indeed, at the 
extreme, courts sometimes do not even recognize vague or underspecified 
claims as identifying trade dress at all.169 But that is atypical. More 
commonly, courts will construe the plaintiff ’s claims narrowly, so there is little 
downside to claiming broadly and strategically. 170 
 
166 Complaint at 5-6, Yeti Coolers v. Blackbird Prods. Grp., LLC, No. 15-1105 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 7, 2015). 
167 See, e.g., Forney Indus., Inc. v. Daco of Mo., 835 F.3d 1238, 1253 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting 
that the plaintiff ’s description was too vague to satisfy the distinctiveness requirement); Yankee 
Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2001) (granting summary 
judgment because the plaintiff did not highlight elements to meet the distinctiveness 
requirement); supra text accompanying note 115. 
168 Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(noting that a defendant may avoid liability through the functionality doctrine, which includes an 
inquiry as to whether trade dress protection “will hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of 
others to compete effectively in the sale of goods”); see also supra text accompanying note 117. For a 
comparison in which a party’s narrow claiming in the registration context saved it from a finding of 
functionality, see In re Bottega Veneta Int’l, S.a.r.l., 2013 WL 5655822, at *1, *8-9 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 
30, 2013) (finding a basket-weave pattern used on leather products nonfunctional because the 
plaintiff had narrowly described the mark as “a configuration of slim, uniformly-sized strips of 
leather, ranging from 8 to 12 millimeters in width, interlaced to form a repeating plain or basket 
weave pattern placed at a 45-degree angle over all or substantially all of the goods”). 
169 See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, 791 F.3d 561, 566-67 (5th Cir. 
2015) (finding that plaintiff failed to assert a trade dress infringement claim despite allegations that 
defendant created a “confusingly similar” web site because the “alleged confusion . . . stems from 
the use of a similar service mark (‘Testmasters’), and the false representation that TES offers a 
similar service (live LSAT courses offered nationwide)”); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 
F.3d 303, 309-11 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff ’s claim for trade dress infringement when it 
had claimed only (1) “a hodgepodge of unconnected pieces of its businesses, which together d[id] 
not comprise any sort of composite visual effect” and (2) “web design,” without further specificity). 
170 See, e.g., Toyo Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd. v. CIA Wheel Grp., No. 15-0246, 2016 WL 4992111, 
at *1-2, *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2016) (finding the plaintiff ’s trade dress nonfunctional after 
defining the claim to include only “the two-dimensional pattern created by the blocks—not the three 
dimensional structure created by the grooves between the blocks or the placement of thin shallow 
channels cut into the blocks known as sipes,” despite the plaintiff ’s description of the trade dress as 
“the overall appearance of its . . . tires”); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N.A., Inc., 703 F. 
Supp. 2d 671, 680, 682-83 (W.D. Ky. 2010), aff ’d, 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012) (allowing the plaintiff 
to narrow the description of its trade dress to emphasize a red dripping wax seal after five years of 
litigation in which the plaintiff never claimed red as an element of the mark and despite a registration 
that made no reference to color).  
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Take the example of a recently filed case in which Lisa Frank, a company 
that makes stickers, school supplies, and other products for kids, sued Orb 
Factory, which sells similar products.171 A representative sampling of Lisa 
Frank’s products is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Lisa Frank Products172 
 
  
Compare these samples to the extraordinarily broad way Lisa Frank described 
its trade dress in its complaint: 
the combination of some or all of the following elements, depending upon 
the product and its packaging, that create a unique overall image and distinct 
visual impression . . . (1) brightly colored bold graphics of distinctive animal 
characters depicted individually or grouped with one or more other such 
characters, with rainbow colored features, large eyes, and happy, friendly 
expressions; (2) use of brilliant, often rainbow sequenced, colors, graduated 
color sequences, and rainbow colors that fade into one another . . . ; (3) 
package, cover and product surface designs featuring, in addition to the 
distinctive animal characters, combinations of rainbows, flowers, ice cream 
cones, butterflies, birds, rabbits, fish, cupcakes, bubbles, peace symbols, 
random words, hearts, happy faces, and stars, often in groups including 
colorful backgrounds employing rainbow colors, color fades and Lisa [F]rank 
pink, props and landscape features such as trees, pools, and snow; and (4) 
product packaging incorporating the look and feel of the products.173 
 
171 First Amended Complaint at 6-7, Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Orb Factory Ltd., No. 15-00433, 2017 
WL 2655406 (D. Az. Sept. 16, 2015) (alleging that the defendant sells products that are “confusingly 
similar” to the plaintiff ’s trade dress). 
172 Id. at 7-8. 
173 Id. at 5. 
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Probably not incidentally, Orb Factory’s products, particularly the ones Lisa 
Frank references in the complaint, generally appear as shown in Figure 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Orb Factory Products174 
 
  
  
 In sum, it is difficult to characterize trade dress claiming given the 
differentiated claiming regimes for registered and unregistered marks. But 
three features stand out. First, regardless of the registration status of the trade 
dress at issue, courts focus primarily on consumer understanding and 
commercial context rather than the form of a registration. Specifically, 
independently of whether trade dress is registered, the scope of a party’s 
rights will nearly always be determined by reference to a claim a mark holder 
makes in the course of litigation. Trade dress claiming is therefore generally 
done late and in the context of particular disputes, which enables strategic 
behavior. Moreover, any notice provided by use of the trade dress or by claims 
made in a registration is at best imperfect because later claims made in the 
context of litigation matter significantly more.175 
Second, trademark law generally emphasizes verbal claims over visual 
ones, as demonstrated by courts’ threshold requirement of verbal description 
as a means for framing distinctiveness and functionality inquiries.176 But the 
 
174 Id. at 7. 
175 As Rebecca Tushnet suggests, this need not be so. Courts could put greater emphasis on 
the form of a registration by requiring that they be more substantive, and in many cases such 
emphasis could actually constrain the scope of a party’s rights. Tushnet, Registering Disagreement, 
supra note 119, at 929-40. 
176 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising 
Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 890-91 (2011) (commenting on the distrust of images in trademark 
law and the simultaneous under- and over-inclusiveness of the verbal-description requirement 
in trade dress litigation). 
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level-of-generality problem looms large here, just as it does in the design 
patent context. In particular, courts have no methodology for determining the 
level of generality at which parties must verbally describe their trade dress. 
As a result, the descriptions courts accept can vary wildly. 
Finally, trade dress claims are best characterized in their varied forms as 
central claims, sometimes by characteristic and sometimes by exemplar. 
Claims in registration, via use in the marketplace, and in litigation—be they 
verbal or visual, early or late—tend to exemplify the trade dress rather than 
describe its periphery (whether with regard to the classes of goods or services 
to which protection extends or to the scope of the design itself).177 When the 
claims come in the form of illustrations or use in the marketplace, they are by 
exemplar because others must discern the design’s pertinent characteristics. By 
contrast, as the examples above demonstrate, the verbal descriptions provided 
to the PTO or to courts tend to be by characteristic, yet they are still central. 
C. Copyright Claiming 
Designs can also benefit from copyright protection, to the extent they 
constitute “original works of authorship fixed in a[] tangible medium of 
expression.”178 For most works created after 1977, the copyright lasts for the 
author’s lifetime plus seventy years.179 Copyright owners hold several 
exclusive rights in relation to their works, including the right to reproduce 
the works, prepare derivative works based on them, and distribute copies.180 
These exclusive rights are violated not only by identical copying, but also by 
the making of substantially similar works.181 According to the Second Circuit, 
two works are considered substantially similar if “the ordinary observer, 
unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook 
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”182 
 
177 See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 795-96 (“[A] trademark protects a set of marks. 
For example, holding the trademark for ‘Pledge’ furniture wax allows the holder to prevent 
others from using ‘Promise’ as a mark for furniture wax. Trademark claims—contained in 
registrations with the PTO—thus seem to be central. And they have a mix of exemplar 
claiming—the mark itself—and characteristic claiming—the sorts of goods and services to which 
the mark can be applied.” (footnote omitted)). 
178 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
179 Id. § 302(a). Anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire have a fixed 
term of either 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever 
expires first. Id. § 302(c). 
180 Id. § 106. 
181 See, e.g., Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007); Whitehead v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[Plaintiff] has provided no direct 
evidence of copying, so he has the burden of establishing both substantial similarity and access.”) 
182 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
When a plaintiff ’s work consists in part of public-domain elements, the Second Circuit further refines 
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Claiming in copyright law shares some features of design patent claiming 
and some of trademark claiming. It is like design patent claiming in that one 
claims one’s work as is, not with regard to its later use or reception in the 
marketplace (as with trademark law).183 But unlike design patent claiming 
and like trademark claiming, copyright typically does not require any “formal” 
claim beyond the work itself until a dispute occurs. Copyright does not 
require formal claims because works are protectable immediately upon 
fixation; formalities are not a prerequisite.184 In that sense, as one of us has 
previously observed, “the copyrighted work stands in as a central claim by 
exemplar for the set of works that are substantially similar or derivative.”185 
That is, the copyrighted work itself is used as the prototype against which all 
allegedly infringing works are compared to see if they share sufficient salient 
characteristics to fall within the scope of the copyright holder’s rights.186 
Despite copyright law’s ostensible rejection of formalities, registration is 
still encouraged and is a requirement for instituting an infringement action.187 
Unlike design patent and trademark applications, however, copyright 
applications are not meaningfully examined.188 And unlike issued design 
patents and trademark registrations, copyright registrations do not contain 
any essential information about the claimed aspects of the copyrighted work; 
the registrations instead consist primarily of administrative data like 
information about the registrant, the work’s title, its completion date, and 
publication date (if any).189 
Moreover, because the copyright infringement standard allows for 
findings of infringement based on partial or fragmented similarity,190 the 
copyrighted work itself often gives very little insight about the particular 
 
its test to require “substantial similarity between those elements, and only those elements, that 
provide copyrightability to the allegedly infringed” work. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183 Supra Sections I.A–B. As we discuss below, infringement in both copyright and design 
patent laws is determined by reference to audience reaction, which complicates this understanding. 
184 See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 743-52 (analyzing copyright law as a system of 
claiming by exemplar, with some claiming by characteristic in licensing); Christopher Sprigman, 
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 539-45 (2004) [hereinafter Sprigman, 
Reform(aliz)ing] (discussing the U.S. move away from copyright formalities). 
185 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 748. 
186 Id. at 748-49. 
187 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2012) (describing the procedures for registering copyright); id. § 411 
(requiring registration as a prerequisite to a civil infringement action, with some exceptions). 
188 See Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 337-38 
(2012) (explaining why copyright applications are not subject to extensive review). 
189 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 745 n.136. 
190 Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a larger work that copies 
“only a small part of the copyrighted work but do[es] so word-for-word” may still be found to 
infringe); see Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1268-72 (2014) [hereinafter Fromer & Lemley, Audience] (discussing courts’ 
varying tests for substantial similarity); Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2231-39 (same). 
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claimed aspects of a work.191 As a result, copyright owners typically identify 
the protected characteristics of their works only in the context of litigation.192 
As with trademark claiming for the first time in litigation, this claiming can 
be strategically targeted to cover the defendant’s allegedly infringing works. 
The lack of claiming methodology and resulting opportunity for strategic 
behavior can lead to a free-for-all in copyright claiming. As just one example, 
consider the Supreme Court’s recent Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, 
Inc.193 decision, which focused on copyright law’s useful articles doctrine. 
Varsity Brands sued Star Athletica for infringing five cheerleading uniform 
designs.194 The Varsity Brands design team originally sketched those designs 
on paper, later producing at least two completed uniforms based on the 
designs. Varsity Brands then registered a copyright in each of the five 
designs.195 It registered three of the designs as “2-dimensional artwork,” for 
which it submitted sketches as deposit copies; the other two it registered as 
“2-dimensional artwork” in the nature of “fabric design (artwork),” 
submitting for each a photograph of a completed uniform incorporating the 
design.196 One of the registration submissions is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
 
191 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 782-83. 
192 Id. 
193 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
194 Id. at 1007. 
195 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *2 (W.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
196 Id. 
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Figure 16: One of Varsity Brands’ Claimed Cheerleading Uniform Designs197 
  
 In its complaint, Varsity Brands included photographs of the allegedly 
infringing designs from Star Athletica’s catalog. For example, it asserted that 
Star Athletica’s design shown in Figure 17 infringed Design 078 in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 17: Star Athletica’s Allegedly Infringing Design198 
 
197 Joint Appendix at 32, Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 
2015) (No. 15-866) [hereinafter Star Athletica Joint Appendix], 2016 WL 3924018.  
198 Id. at 33. 
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Note that Star Athletica’s allegedly infringing design is not identical to 
Varsity Brands’. Varsity Brands’ side panels are white, whereas Star Athletica’s 
are light blue. Both stripe patterns have the same colors, but the patterns 
themselves are different. The skirt designs are also different. Perhaps for this 
reason, Varsity Brands claimed its design holistically in the complaint, 
referring only to Design 078 depicted in Figure 16. At various points during 
the litigation, Varsity Brands referred verbally to the aspects of this design it 
thought were copyrightable: “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s [or 
chevrons] and shapes and the arrangement and placement of those 
elements.”199 Varsity Brands almost certainly described its design at this high 
level of generality so that it would encompass non-identical designs like Star 
Athletica’s. And that proved to be successful, as every court that ruled on 
Varsity Brands’ claims accepted its description, characterizing Varsity Brands’ 
works in terms of the “graphic features of Varsity [Brands’] designs—the 
arrangement of stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking.”200 
Interestingly, when it needed to describe its designs verbally in order to 
overcome the Copyright Office’s initial refusal to register them, Varsity 
Brands did so with much greater specificity. Take, for example, its description 
of another design, Design 538: 
DESIGN 538 . . . has a central field of black bordered at the bottom by a 
gray/white/black multistripe forming a shallow “vee” of which the left-hand 
leg is horizontal, while the right-hand leg stretches “northeast” at 
approximately a forty-five degree angle. Below the upward-angled leg of the 
shallow “vee” is a similarly angled wider white stripe, succeeded by an area 
of black. The central field of black is bordered on top by an “X” figure formed 
of the same gray/white/black multistripe that appears at the bottom, with the 
colors reversed. Above the “X” is a field of white; the wedges at either side 
of the “X” are subdivided horizontally into approximately equal-sized wedges 
of black over white.201 
Varsity Brands claimed Design 538 with this level of specificity 
because the Copyright Office might otherwise have believed that the 
 
199 Id. at 242; accord id. at 284 (emphasizing “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s and shapes 
and the arrangement and placement of those elements”); cf. id. at 237 (referring to all five designs as 
“compris[ing] original combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements which include V’s 
(chevrons), lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes, etc.”). 
200 Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 491; accord Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
1002, 1012 (2017) (characterizing Varsity’s copyright claim as centering on “the arrangement of colors, 
shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the . . . cheerleading uniforms”); Varsity Brands, 2014 WL 819422, 
at *9 (referring to Varsity Brands’ copyright claim as directed to “the lines, patterns, and chevrons”). 
201 Star Athletica Joint Appendix, supra note 197, at 140. 
2018] Claiming Design 165 
design lacked originality202 or was an unprotectable useful article, as we 
discuss below.203 By claiming narrowly, Varsity Brands apparently 
thought—probably correctly—that the Copyright Office would be more 
likely to acknowledge an original and copyrightable contribution. 
Yet the contrast between Varsity Brands’ different claims is striking. 
When it sought to establish copyrightability at the Copyright Office—making 
its claim independently of any purported infringement—Varsity Brands 
claimed narrowly. But when it sued Star Athletica, Varsity Brands claimed far 
more generally to make it easier to establish infringement. And it could 
manipulate its claim strategically in this way without fear that its narrower 
early claim would be held against it. 
The difference in generality of claims matters because the Supreme 
Court’s approach in Star Athletica puts significant pressure on claiming in 
cases involving useful articles. A useful article is a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work “having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to 
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”204 Copyright 
law denies protection to features of a useful article unless the article 
“incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.”205 
According to the Supreme Court, features are separable when they 
(1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from 
the useful article, and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work—either on [their] own or fixed in some other tangible medium 
of expression—if [they] were imagined separately from the useful article.206 
In the process of evaluating Varsity Brands’ designs under this rule, the 
Court implicitly differentiated between designs on useful articles, which can 
be imagined separately even if they correspond to the shape of the article, 
and the design of an article, which cannot be so imagined. 
Yet the question of whether Varsity Brands’ designs were surface 
ornamentation (design on) or instead depicted the configuration of 
cheerleading uniforms divided courts at every level of the litigation.207 
Indeed, each of the three opinions in the Supreme Court reflected a different 
understanding of Varsity Brands’ claimed design. According to the majority, 
 
202 See supra text accompanying note 178. 
203 See infra text accompanying notes 204–05. 
204 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
205 Id. 
206 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). 
207 For more on this issue, see Mark P. McKenna, Knowing Separability When We See It, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 127, 131-32 (2017). 
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Varsity Brands claimed “surface designs” consisting primarily of 
“‘combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements’ that include 
‘chevrons . . . , lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted [chevrons], 
coloring, and shapes.’”208 Those surface designs simply “correspond[ed] to the 
shape of the useful article[s]” (the cheerleading uniforms).209 Justice 
Ginsburg took the “surface design” theme even further in her concurrence, in 
which she described the designs as “standalone pictorial and graphic works 
that [Varsity Brands] reproduce[d] on cheerleading uniforms.”210 In her view, 
those standalone works were not designs of useful articles, and separability 
analysis was therefore not even necessary. Justice Breyer saw things quite 
differently. In his view, the designs inescapably depicted cheerleading 
uniforms because Varsity Brands did not merely claim a series of chevrons 
and stripes; instead, it claimed chevrons and stripes “as they [were] arranged 
on the neckline, waistline, sleeves, and skirt of each uniform.”211 
That variation in understanding of the relevant designs matters 
enormously. Despite the majority’s insistence that “two-dimensional artistic 
features on the surface of useful articles” are not “inherently separable,”212 it 
is hard not to see as dispositive the majority’s characterization of Varsity 
Brands’ works as surface designs applied to cheerleading uniforms. It is, 
however, entirely unclear why that characterization is the most natural one. 
Among other things, the correct understanding of Varsity Brands’ claims 
turns in significant part on whether we focus on the images in the deposit 
copies Varsity Brands submitted with its applications to register the designs 
or instead on Varsity Brands’ later characterization of those designs. 
The majority’s description of Varsity Brands’ works as drawings of various 
features in some arrangement ignores the reality of the images submitted to 
the Copyright Office. Those images do not simply depict chevrons and lines; 
they depict cheerleading uniforms with particular design features. That, of 
course, does not necessarily mean that Varsity Brands claimed every aspect of 
what is shown in the deposit copy images, but uncertainty about what the 
images reflect is precisely the problem. Copyright registration does not 
require visual demarcation of the claimed features, nor does it require a clear 
verbal identification of those features. As a result, one cannot simply look at 
a copyright registration and determine the scope of the registrant’s claim.213 
 
208 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. 
209 Id. at 1012. 
210 Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
211 Id. at 1035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
212 Id. at 1009. 
213 See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 745 n.136 (“To register, an applicant must 
complete a form with information about the applicant and the work’s title, completion date, and 
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This is a potentially significant issue in the context of useful articles—which 
many designs are—because the same visual image in a deposit copy could 
reflect at least two different types of claims. One might, for example, make a 
model of a car and submit an image of that model to claim rights in the 
model.214 As the Star Athletica majority noted, the car model would be 
copyrightable even if the owner could not enforce its rights against a party that 
made an actual car with the same design.215 But one could also submit an image 
of the model car and claim features depicted in the image in the same way 
Varsity Brands claimed the features depicted in images of its cheerleading 
uniforms—as features that might be “applied to” the car itself.216 That is to say 
that the very same deposit copy could form the basis of a claim to a particular 
depiction of a car—but not the design of an actual car—or to features of an 
actual car. Because the registration process does not require delineation of the 
claim, third parties cannot really know how a putative copyright owner will 
define its claim until litigation. 
That timing is a problem because Star Athletica makes separability turn on 
whether features of a useful article can be imagined separately as a work of 
authorship that is not itself a useful article.217 What features are we to 
“imagine” separately, and how do we know whether those features can be 
recognized as a work of authorship or instead simply depict the useful article? 
The majority had very little to offer on either of those questions; it 
simply accepted that Varsity Brands’ design consisted of a combination of 
chevrons and other lines arranged in some format. But if we are to assume 
that separability implies evaluation of something less than the entirety of 
the design, then the first step in the separability analysis must be 
identification of the purportedly separable features.218 And surely 
identification must at least start with the features the plaintiff claims should 
be imagined separately. Here, the lack of claiming methodology in copyright 
is likely to pose significant issues. 
In particular, the descriptions of the designs at issue are likely to matter 
in separability cases because at different levels of abstraction the purportedly 
 
publication date (if any) but nothing about the work’s content or the set of works protected by 
the copyright.” (citations omitted)). 
214 One could, of course, also claim copyright in the image of the model itself, distinct from the 
model. But that image would not be a useful article, so it would not be subject to separability analysis. 
215 See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010 (“Although the replica could itself be copyrightable, it 
would not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.”). 
216 See id. at 1005 (“§ 113(a) . . . protects art first fixed in a medium other than a useful article 
and subsequently applied to a useful article.” (emphasis added)). 
217 Id. at 1010. 
218 Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion’s Function, supra note 31, at 65-69, 85-93. In fact, the Court made 
it clear the decisionmaker must “determine that the separately identified feature has the capacity to 
exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010. 
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separable features are going to look more like works of authorship that can 
be imagined separately—or, conversely, more like the platonic form of the 
useful article.219 In other words, the level of abstraction of the description is 
going to influence whether a court regards the design simply as that of “a 
shovel as a shovel,” or instead as an article that consists, at least in part, of 
“artistic features that could be perceived as art apart from the shovel, and 
which would qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works on 
their own or in another medium.”220 
As this discussion indicates, copyright claiming is hard to characterize 
precisely because there is so little methodology to it.221 From the moment a 
work is fixed until and unless the owner asserts rights in the work, the 
copyrighted work itself serves as the copyright claim. The work serves as an 
exemplar against which other works are compared to determine infringement. 
Because copyright’s infringement standard does not require identity but only 
substantial similarity,222 the author’s rights actually extend beyond the four 
corners of the work. The work thus serves as a “central claim by exemplar.”223 
 
219 Cf. Mala Chatterjee, Note, Conceptual Separability as Conceivability: A Philosophical Analysis 
of the Useful Articles Doctrine, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 558, 558-61 (2018) (using the philosophical framework 
of conceivability to analyze which features of useful article are separable). 
220 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013 n.2. As difficult as it may be to develop a consistent claiming 
methodology, the alternative is for courts simply to engage in artistic evaluation, as the majority did 
for Duchamp’s shovel. Indeed, the only way the Court could confidently have concluded that there 
were no separable features of the shovel was to determine (implicitly, and without the benefit of any 
claim to particular features) that none of the features of that shovel were sufficiently artistic to “be 
perceived as art apart from the shovel.” Id. This is risky business because we have long been told 
that it is “a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of [artistic expression], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). The majority’s test at least flirts 
with that undertaking; divorcing separability from any particular claim leaves courts with essentially 
no other option. Cf. Barton Beebe, Star Athletica and the Problem of Panaestheticism, 9 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123967 (“[When] the law begins to pursue a separation between the 
utilitarian and the aesthetic . . . the law finds itself on . . . the wrong . . . side of that divide, where 
it is no longer engaging in legal reasoning . . . . [I]t is engaging in aesthetic thinking about the 
meaningful and the beautiful.”). 
221 Margot Kaminski and Guy Rub recognize a related issue when they discuss how 
“[c]opyright faces a framing problem . . . . When courts adjudicate copyright disputes, they often 
begin their analysis by deciding either to frame the copyrighted work as a whole or to focus on its 
components or parts.” Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA 
L. REV. 1102, 1104 (2017). They refer to the former as “zooming out” and the latter as “zooming in.” 
Id. We think copyright law indeed has a framing problem, but it is multidimensional and not only 
about zooming out or zooming in. As discussed in this section, copyright law’s framing problem is 
about which particular aspects of a copyrighted work one decides to focus on and at which level of 
generality one views a work. And this problem derives from copyright law’s lack of a claiming 
methodology. For Kaminski and Rub’s quite different take on how copyright law’s framing problem 
affects useful articles, see id. at 1128-41. 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 178–82. 
223 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 748. 
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The work’s characteristics and its periphery are generally not further specified 
until and unless there is a copyright dispute. The timing of copyright claiming 
therefore tends to be late, and claims can be strategically crafted to fit the 
contours of particular disputes. That is true even if the copyright holder 
chooses to register the work prior to and independently of the dispute; unlike 
design patent and trademark, registration does not require any meaningful 
identification of the claimed aspects of the work. Because there is little to no 
reflection on claiming in copyright law, the level of generality and the 
medium of specification can vary, typically at the claimant’s choosing and 
without much pushback or legal reflection. 
*      *      * 
If nothing else, this Part’s tour of the claiming rules in design patent, 
trademark, and copyright—the three primary intellectual property systems 
that protect design—shows how varied the claiming regimes are. Although 
they all employ central, rather than peripheral, claiming, the claiming regimes 
vary along other important dimensions, especially: 
• whether claiming is by exemplar or by characteristic; 
• the timing of the claims and their independence from particular 
disputes; 
• the form of the claims (visual or verbal); and 
• the level of generality at which claims can be made. 
In the next Part, we begin analyzing the consequences of choices along 
these dimensions for a system for claiming design. 
II. INTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLAIMING DESIGN 
The choice of claiming system for each design protection regime has 
important internal consequences. That is, a design protection regime’s 
adoption of central or peripheral claiming; exemplar or characteristic 
claiming; early or late claiming; visual or verbal claiming; and more or less 
abstract claiming have significant effects on the operation of that regime. The 
most important effects relate to the background information the claimant can 
use to structure its claim at the time that claim is made (and the related ability 
to frame litigation); the extent to which a regime’s claim format is elastic or 
manifold (which can lead to inconsistent or patchwork claiming); the 
adequacy of notice; the difficulty of fixing claim scope; and the degree to 
which claimants must internalize claiming choices with regard to both 
validity and scope. Because the various dimensions we discussed above 
influence each regime in these respects, we organize the following sections in 
terms of the effects of claiming choices, highlighting relevant claiming 
dimensions along the way. In light of this analysis, we suggest ways in which 
each claiming regime might be optimized. 
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A. Claim Timing and Information Available to Shape the Claim 
At the outset, it is important to note that there are two critical timing 
issues with regard to claiming design. First is the timing of claiming vis-à-vis 
commercialization of the claimant’s design. Second is the timing with regard 
to a particular assertion of rights. Claiming can happen early with regard to 
both commercialization and rights assertion, late with regard to both, or late 
with regard to commercialization but early with regard to assertion. 
With this framing of timing variables in claiming design, consider how 
the background information available at that moment in time can shape the 
claim itself. Given the incentives design patent law creates, designers are 
likely to file their applications early in their own commercialization timeline, 
and possibly early with respect to potential competitors, depending on how 
crowded the competitive landscape is at the time of the application.224 Even 
if the market in which the applicant’s design will compete is crowded, neither 
a potential competitor nor the applicant is likely to know at the time of 
application how any competitor’s design will compete with the applicant’s 
new design. Still, a smart, forward-looking applicant would devote time and 
resources to understanding the competitive landscape and the ways others 
might respond to the applicant’s design in order to make informed claiming 
choices. This thoughtful applicant would also think about how it expects to 
market the new design. Of course, no applicant can foresee every competitive 
development during the design patent term. But any thoughtful applicant 
realizes it is helpful to think about the future before making a design patent 
claim in order to maximize design patent scope vis-à-vis competitors’ designs. 
The incentive early claiming gives to an applicant—to consider how it will 
market its design and how competitors might respond—is a feature, not a bug. 
Consider the comparative case of utility patent law’s disclosure and utility 
doctrines, which force inventors who file their patent applications early in the 
development process to consider whether they can enable the scope of their 
claims and whether their inventions have specific and substantial utility.225 
 
224 That said, savvy design patent applicants can use patent continuations to secure protection 
on certain variations of an earlier protected design, perhaps finding a way to secure protection for 
competitors’ later-issued designs. See Burstein, Patented Design, supra note 67, at 221 (noting that 
“design patent practitioners can use the PTO’s continuation procedures to ‘evergreen’ design patent 
protection for a particular product for thirty or even forty years”); Perry J. Saidman, The Crisis in 
the Law of Designs, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 301, 319-22 (2007) [hereinafter Saidman, 
Crisis] (discussing an example of such practice for a lever-operated corkscrew). 
225 The enablement requirement puts the onus on the applicant to disclose the invention in a 
way that “teach[es] those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed 
invention without undue experimentation.” Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 
F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The disclosure must also describe the invention in sufficient terms 
such that one skilled in the art would conclude that the inventor actually possessed the claimed 
invention at the time of filing. See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 
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Inventors that can satisfy those criteria will have to disclose the information 
demonstrating so; if they cannot satisfy the criteria, they will go back to the 
drawing board and refine their inventions, thereby advancing their inventions 
to society’s benefit.226 Analogously, requiring early claiming of designs should 
force businesses to think through their designs and how they intend to 
commercialize and market those designs. Early claiming gives designers an 
incentive to articulate claims that correspond to their market intentions, which 
they might not otherwise have thought through as thoroughly at that stage. 
Two important features of current design patent law might, however, 
prevent that desirable outcome by giving designers the incentive to claim 
their designs broadly and in as piecemeal a manner as possible. First, 
designers can claim their designs broadly without fear they will be denied a 
design patent on novelty or nonobviousness grounds because those 
protectability thresholds are enforced laxly, if at all.227 And second, because 
design patent allows such extreme partial claiming, designers can fragment 
their designs into multiple design patent applications and thereby achieve far 
broader protection than they could receive if they were required to claim the 
design of an article as a whole.228 To the extent modern design patent doctrine 
provides these incentives to claim broadly, we think it dilutes the important 
potential benefits of early claiming. 
Designers who do claim in ways that anticipate their marketing are likely 
to do a better job of providing notice to the public of both the design right 
and the way the rightsholder might envision using the design in the 
marketplace, something we discuss below.229 In terms of notice, then, it is 
important that the law hold a claimant to the limits of claims that express 
 
1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The utility requirement demands that the invention offer a “specific 
benefit” in its “currently available form.” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966). 
226 The Supreme Court has explained that the disclosure requirement “stimulate[s] ideas and 
the eventual development of further significant advances in the art.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). As one of us has described, “patent disclosure indirectly stimulates 
future innovation by revealing the invention’s design so that others can use it fruitfully when the 
patent term expires and design around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention, even during 
the patent term.” Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009) [hereinafter 
Fromer, Patent Disclosure]; accord Fromer, Dynamic Disclosure, supra note 58, at 1716-19 (describing the 
“multiple ways” in which effective patent disclosure should “stimulate further innovation”). 
227 See McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6, at 38-42. 
228 See Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” Today, supra note 32, at 787-88 (“Partial claiming allows 
a design patent owner to succeed on an infringement claim where the defendant’s product, 
considered as a whole, doesn’t look the same as the patent owner’s product.”). 
229 Infra Section II.C. 
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those intentions, whether or not the designer’s eventual use of the design in 
the marketplace matches its initial intentions.230 
That said, it cannot be emphasized enough that the legal incentives to claim 
early might be sufficiently strong that even sophisticated claimants will sometimes 
(perhaps even often) be unable to claim in a way that encompasses the full range 
of potential competitive designs. At the time at which designers must make their 
claims, they may lack sufficient information about potential competitor responses. 
And of course competitor behavior is a moving target because competitors will 
often attempt to circumvent existing claims to intellectual property once those 
claims are known to them. Take, for example, Two Pesos using the color blue for 
the exterior of its restaurant, possibly to avoid the pink color it likely perceived to 
be a critical limit on Taco Cabana’s rights in the design of its restaurants.231 In the 
design patent realm, consider how the makers of the Insta-Pull lever-operated 
corkscrew, depicted on the right in Figure 18, may have designed their product to 
distinguish it from the Rabbit lever-operated corkscrew claimed in the design 
patent drawing shown on the left. 
 
 
230 Of course, because design patent claims are central, rather than peripheral, early claims will 
not strictly limit a claimant to its early predictions about the competitive landscape. But the initial 
claim does clearly form the core, anchoring claim scope. Supra Section I.A. 
231 Supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text. Design patent applicants can frustrate that timing 
by filing design patent applications as divisional applications from parent patent applications, which 
might have been pending for a longer time. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 59, at 115-16 
(explaining the “keep [one] in the oven” strategy, by which design patent applicants can “go back to 
the PTO and capture competing products that were introduced after the first design patent 
application was filed—even if those competing products did not infringe the original patent claim” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Saidman, Crisis, supra note 224, at 319-21 (describing an example of 
such a continuation application strategy involving lever-operated corkscrews). When they do that, 
they might be delaying claiming until the design is more complete and potentially commercialized. 
That sort of delay might also give the design patent owner more opportunity to consider what 
competitors are doing and to claim strategically in relation to those competitors. 
2018] Claiming Design 173 
Figure 18: Rabbit232 (Left) and Insta-Pull233 (Right) Lever-Operated 
Corkscrews 
 
When the Rabbit corkscrew’s maker discovered this competitor, it filed 
for—and secured—broader design patents, depicted in Figure 19, as 
continuations of its issued design patent, with the apparent aim of rendering 
the Insta-Pull’s otherwise different design infringing. 
 
Figure 19: Design Patent Continuations234 
 
232 U.S. Patent No. D446,098 fig.1. 
233 Happy Easter, THE WEEKLY SCREW: THE VIRTUAL CORKSCREW MUSEUM’S WEEKLY 
NEWSPAPER (Apr. 16, 2006), http://www.bullworks.net/daily/weekly003.htm [https://perma.cc/
E7XD-MBYW]. 
234 U.S. Patent No. D442,045 fig.1; U.S. Patent No. D441,265 fig.1. 
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Indeed, after being granted these two new design patents, the 
Rabbit’s maker filed suit against the Insta-Pull maker, though the court 
refused to find infringement.235 
The encouragement that an early claiming regime provides for parties to 
commit to a particular commercialization or marketing strategy can have 
other downsides. Early claiming makes it more difficult for businesses to 
defer commercialization or marketing commitments until they better 
understand how consumers will react to their design. And one could imagine 
that claims would, in some circumstances, be clearer if they were drawn with 
better information about the sorts of competitive designs one intended to 
encompass. Early claiming may lead to more partial or fragmented claiming 
as a way to hedge against narrow rights that could otherwise result from a 
failure to anticipate consumers’ and competitors’ responses to a protected 
design. Take the example of Aquazzura’s Christy shoe design. Not only has 
that design been a commercial success, but it seems to have awakened in 
consumers an interest in certain alternative laced designs, like Ivanka 
Trump’s. Perhaps Aquazzura’s design patent rights would have been 
construed to encompass Trump’s design; perhaps they would not. But the 
scope of Aquazurra’s claim likely would have been clearer if it had known how 
this design might later be understood in the marketplace. 
Trademark claiming differs from design patent claiming in terms of 
timing and the availability of information about consumer understanding and 
competitor behavior. Recall that trademark owners can choose whether to 
register their designs.236 Other than the general advantages of earlier 
registration, there is comparatively less pressure to register trademarks early 
 
235 Metrokane, Inc. v. Wine Enthusiast, 185 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
Interestingly, the court took disapproving notice of the plaintiff ’s strategic continuation filings: 
It is quite revealing that plaintiff filed the applications for the two patents in suit only 
after plaintiff had seen defendant’s accused device on the market and had acquired a 
specimen of it and, indeed, only a few days before the original Complaint in this action 
was filed. Plaintiff obviously scrutinized defendant’s device for any points of visual 
similarity to its own commercial device, and focused the patent drawings on these 
narrow features, however inconsequential and little noticed they had been before. The 
design patent laws were established to encourage the decorative arts by providing 
temporally limited protection for meritorious ornamental designs. They were not 
intended to empower patent owners to harass competitors who are marketing devices 
which happen to incorporate parts whose shapes resemble insignificant physical details 
of the patent owner’s products. This is apparently the game of “gotcha” which plaintiff 
is attempting to play in this case. 
Id. at 327-28 (citation omitted). 
236 Supra Section I.B. 
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than there is to apply for a design patent because trademark rights arise out 
of the use of a protectable mark rather than out of registration.237 
We suspect that, even when parties seek to register their trade dress before 
litigation, they still apply well after they have commercialized the trade dress, 
and that the delay in seeking registration relative to commercialization is more 
pronounced for trade dress than it is for other types of marks. Use-based 
applications must be based on preexisting use, which means registered designs 
necessarily have been commercialized to some extent before application. 
Product designs in particular should have been in relatively widespread use, 
typically for some time, before the date of application because product design 
cannot be registered unless and until the design has acquired secondary 
meaning.238 Those registration timing rules probably correspond to designer 
motivations, as we doubt that many businesses develop product design for the 
purpose of designating source but instead seek to protect certain design 
aspects as trade dress when they later come to serve that purpose for 
consumers (or, more cynically, when other legal options are unavailable).239 
Converse’s suit against Wal-Mart and New Balance is instructive. In that 
case, Converse alleged that the defendants infringed Converse’s trademark 
rights in the design of its Chuck Taylor athletic shoes, which it claimed 
consisted of the features shown in Figure 20.240 
 
 
237 Priority is also determined by use, subject to constructive-use provisions relating to 
intent-to-use applications. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b), 1057(c) (2012). Because determining the nature 
and amount of use necessary to establish priority can be difficult, there is some incentive to apply 
to register on the basis of an intent to use a mark, which would set one’s priority date in relation 
to the filing date. But product design is protectable only with evidence of secondary meaning. 
See supra text accompanying note 236. Therefore, parties cannot apply to register design on the 
basis of an intent to use it. Thus, priority for purposes of product design is entirely determined 
by use. There are obviously advantages to registration in terms of the geographic scope of rights. 
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (specifying that filing an application to register a mark confers a 
“nationwide” right of priority). 
238 Supra Section I.B. 
239 Cf. David H. B. Bednall et al., Color, Champagne, and Trademark Secondary Meaning 
Surveys: Devilish Detail, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 967, 971 (2012) (“Once they have established a 
brand, companies seek to build and then protect their brand equity.”); Steffen Herm & Jana Möller, 
Brand Identification by Product Design: The Impact of Evaluation Mode and Familiarity, PSYCHOL. & 
MARKETING 1084, 1084 (2014) (“Once companies have established strong associations between 
product designs and brands in consumers’ minds, they seek protection against imitation as well as 
consistency in product lines.”). Here there is likely some contrast with product packaging, which 
we suspect businesses tend to register earlier in relation to commercialization than they do product 
configuration because those businesses are more likely to be focusing on legal protection when 
they create that packaging. And that would make sense because product packaging is capable of 
being considered inherently distinctive and is therefore potentially protectable immediately upon 
use. Supra Section I.B. 
240 Complaint at 4, In re Certain Footwear Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-936, (USITC June 23, 2016), 
available at http://www.itcblog.com/images/conversecomplaintpart1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9LA-BUBB]. 
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Figure 20: Converse Trade Dress Claim241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Wal-Mart and New Balance emphasized in their arguments to the 
Federal Circuit, Converse claimed the shoe design as trade dress only after 
many years of use, during which it had emphasized not the design elements, 
but the Converse brand and All Star logo.242 
Such post-use claiming sets up a different dynamic than does earlier 
design patent claiming. Those who claim trade dress rights after a long period 
of use have the opportunity to gauge competitors’ reactions and to see how 
consumers understand the design in the marketplace before asserting a claim. 
These pieces of information give trademark claimants the opportunity to 
define their claims so as to sweep both consumer understanding and 
competitor designs within the claim boundaries. 
Parties that assert rights in unregistered trade dress can delay claiming even 
further because they do not have to identify the elements of their trade dress 
until they decide to enforce rights in their designs.243 Those parties can shape 
their claims to encompass the particular uses they allege infringe their rights. 
Copyright is similar to trademark in the sense that registration is optional. 
Copyright vests as soon as an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible 
medium. As in trademark, there are some advantages to registering a 
copyright; most obviously, one cannot sue to enforce a copyright unless and 
until it is registered.244 Even though the copyrighted work serves as the 
exemplar in a central claim to the work, copyright owners refine their claims 
only in the course of litigation. 
There are two primary benefits of recognizing unregistered rights. The 
first, and most obvious, is the low cost of rights acquisition. Second, and 
related, is the ability to defer judgment about which rights to pursue until it 
 
241 Corrected Non-Confidential Principal Brief of Intervenors at 7, Converse, Inc. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, No. 2016-2497, 2017 WL 2870241 (Fed. Cir. June 26, 2017). 
242 Id. at 9-14. 
243 Supra Section I.B. 
244 Supra Section I.C. 
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is clear which marks or works are commercially valuable. Trademarks and 
copyrighted works both may have limited commercial life, and so they may 
not be worth the time and expense of registration. In fact, we suspect that 
design will often have an especially limited commercial life, relative to 
paradigmatic trademark and copyright subject matter (word marks and logos, 
for trademark; books and songs, for copyright). Designers’ ability to delay 
claiming therefore permits them to capture unscrupulous behavior as it is 
happening in the market without wasting resources registering designs that 
aren’t worth the expenditures. 
That said, there are real costs to late claiming. As the Taco Cabana, Lisa 
Frank, and Varsity Brands examples all demonstrate, allowing parties to delay 
claiming until litigation enables them to define their claims strategically so as 
to encompass alleged infringers’ behavior, something that would be more 
difficult if they were forced to claim rights earlier and independently of a 
particular dispute. Delayed claiming also diminishes the adequacy of notice, 
as we discuss below.245 
With this analysis of claim timing and the background information 
available to shape the claims at the moment of claiming, we turn now to the 
extent to which a regime’s claim format is elastic or manifold, which can lead 
to inconsistent or patchwork claiming within a single regime. 
B. The Elasticity and Multiplicity of Claim Formats 
As our discussion above indicates, claim format is elastic—and often 
multiple—within any one design protection regime. Elasticity and 
multiplicity emerge out of a regime’s claiming features: central claiming; 
allowance of multiple, different claims over time; and intermingling of visual 
and verbal claims. In this section, we analyze the possibility that inconsistent 
or patchwork claims might emerge for a single design within a single regime. 
Later, in sections C and D, respectively, we take up the related consequences 
for the adequacy of notice and claim scope. 
1. Central Claiming, by Exemplar and Characteristic 
As we have noted, the three intellectual property regimes that can protect 
designs—design patent, trademark, and copyright—are best characterized as 
utilizing forms of central claiming. They use central claiming because 
claimants in these legal regimes identify some—but not all—members of the 
set of designs protected by the right. Designs not specifically claimed might 
still be protected by these regimes by virtue of infringement rules that permit 
 
245 Infra Section II.C. 
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non-identical designs to be considered within the scope of the claimant’s 
rights. That stands in contrast to systems of peripheral claiming, which 
require identification of all members of a given set.246 
Before any litigation, the central claims in all three areas are principally 
made by exemplar because the claims identify a particular member or 
members of the set of protected designs rather than describing characteristics 
shared by these members.247 In design patent, the exemplar is, unsurprisingly, 
the design depicted in the drawing; in trademark law, it is the trade dress 
being used in the marketplace (whether or not the trade dress is registered); 
and in copyright law, the exemplar is the work that has been fixed.248 Third 
parties are then left to adduce the scope of the claim from the claimed 
exemplar and to determine whether their designs have enough characteristics 
in common with the exemplar to be covered by the protected design right. If 
litigation occurs, these systems of claiming by exemplar are supplemented, to 
differing extents depending on the legal regime, by claiming by characteristic. 
That is, rightsholders and courts describe the prototypical—if not the 
essential—characteristics of the design in the course of litigation. 
This particular combination of claiming regimes—central and by 
exemplar before litigation and then also by characteristic once litigated—has 
important implications. A system of central claiming by its nature creates the 
possibility of multiple claims that may be at different levels of generality or 
even inconsistent with each other. Central claiming enables this multiplicity 
of claims because no single claim is thought to capture the periphery of the 
creation, but rather identifies a prototype or central aspects of the creation.249 
Other variations thus might be encompassed within the creation’s scope 
whether or not they fall within the central claim’s bounds. 
For that reason, central claims at varying levels of generality or even 
inconsistent claims are not necessarily nonsensical.250 Multiple central claims 
might each focus attention on the salient aspects of a creation based on the 
context in which each claim is made. In that sense, it is much like the way we 
understand many concepts like a “game.” We might reasonably make a central 
 
246 Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 105, at 1745, 1749; Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 724-30. 
247 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 724-30. 
248 The exception to prelitigation claiming by exemplar is the registered trademark, which 
comprises some claiming by characteristic in the registration’s verbal description. Supra Section I.B. 
249 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 726-27. 
250 In one limited circumstance, inconsistent claims might be disallowed. Pursuant to the 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, design patent law disallows the reclaiming of material 
that was disclaimed or narrowed during prosecution of a claim. Pac. Coast Marine Windshields 
Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 700-02 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-731 (2002) (holding that prosecution history 
estoppel promotes clarity and that “[t]his clarity is essential to promote progress, because it enables 
efficient investment in innovation”). 
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claim for a “game” that focuses on rules, competitive play according to those 
rules, and a winner of the competition. But we can also have central claims 
for a “game” that, instead or additionally, focuses on cooperative play—
thinking of games like Pandemic251—or on the absence of victory conditions—
thinking of games like The Ungame.252 Or we can have a central claim that 
demands that a “game” depends on skill—as in chess253—and another that 
says, seemingly in opposition, that a “game” depends on luck—as in Candy 
Land.254 All of these can reasonably be central claims, made alone or together, 
for a “game.” On this view, the potential multiplicity of central claims is 
essentially benign, or perhaps helpful in focusing attention on relevant 
features, even if some of the claims seem incompatible. 
On another understanding, multiplicity is worrisome in that a claimant 
can strategically multiply claims that are inconsistent or that vary in 
generality and thereby undermine clarity. As just one example, consider 
again the very detailed claim Varsity Brands submitted to the Copyright 
Office when it sought registration of its cheerleading uniform design.255 As 
discussed above, Varsity Brands likely crafted that claim to convince a 
skeptical Copyright Office that it deserved at least narrow protection on a 
possibly unoriginal useful article.256 Yet when Varsity Brands sued Star 
Athletica for infringing its uniform designs, it claimed copyright in those 
designs at a much more abstract and encompassing level, describing the 
designs as consisting of “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s, and shapes 
and the arrangement and placement of those elements.”257 Each of those 
claims, read in isolation, gives a very different sense of the scope of Varsity 
Brands’ copyrights. Anyone who read both claims together would surely be 
befuddled as to what those copyrights cover. 
2. Claim Timing 
Not only does claim timing vary across the different design protection 
regimes, as we discussed in the previous section,258 but each separate regime 
 
251 Pandemic, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/30549/pandemic 
[https://perma.cc/LY95-GY8W] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
252 The Ungame, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/6283/ungame 
[https://perma.cc/J4H4-7FN3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
253 Chess, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/171/chess [https://perma.cc/
CK2R-HYUY] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
254 Candy Land, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/5048/candy-
land [https://perma.cc/6N4S-JAZH] (last visited Feb. Sept. 30, 2018). 
255 Supra text accompanying note 201. 
256 Supra text accompanying notes 202–03. 
257 Star Athletica Joint Appendix, supra note 197, at 242. 
258 Supra Section II.A. 
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often permits parties to claim at multiple times. Design patent claims are 
formalized in the patent application, but they often are supplemented to some 
extent by verbal descriptions of the design in litigation.259 Parties formulate their 
trademark claims in applications to register their marks or in litigation.260 And 
copyright claims can be made in applications to register and in litigation.261 
When a single regime allows parties to claim at multiple points in time, 
chances are good that the claim content will vary based on the background 
information that is available and salient at the time of the claim. Claim 
multiplicity, then, results not just from central claiming, but also from the fact that 
all of the design protection regimes permit claiming at multiple points in time. 
3. Visual and Verbal Claiming 
Claims can also multiply within any one regime because parties combine 
visual and verbal claims. Before describing the contribution of differing 
modes of claiming to multiplicity, we first compare the three design 
protection regimes in terms of the dominance of visual or verbal claiming. 
We then analyze how visual claiming and verbal claiming of what otherwise 
might seem like the same information might lead to different 
understandings of that information. 
Design patent, trademark, and copyright law vary in terms of the 
dominant medium in which parties are expected to make their claims. In 
design patent law, claiming is entirely visual, but in litigation the visual claims 
are commonly supplemented to some extent by verbal description.262 
Claiming is hybrid in the trademark registration context, in that a claim will 
typically consist of a drawing, a verbal description of the mark depicted in 
the drawing, and a classification of the goods or services for which the design 
will be used.263 The verbal descriptions, however, are highly inconsistent, 
even though they are required for designs. By contrast, unregistered trade 
dress claimed for the first time in litigation must be verbally claimed, and 
that verbal description supplements the visual trade dress actually being used 
in the marketplace.264 Copyright claiming is most like claiming of 
unregistered trade dress, in that parties claim principally in verbal form in 
the context of infringement litigation, supplementing the exemplar claims 
that are the works themselves.265 
 
259 Supra Section I.A. 
260 Supra Section I.B. 
261 Supra Section I.C. 
262 See supra Section I.A. 
263 See supra Section I.B. The form of the registration, however, tends not to control in 
infringement litigation. 
264 See supra Section I.B. 
265 See supra Section I.C. 
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These differences in claiming medium, even when claims appear to be 
conveying the same information, can also yield distinctions in the 
understanding of that information. As courts have emphasized with regard 
to design patent claims, visual claims typically are thought to be perceived 
more holistically than verbal claims, which are thought to be more readily 
picked apart into their constituent pieces.266 To the extent these legal 
characterizations accurately reflect human psychology—and evidence 
indicates they generally do267—visual and verbal claims will effectively 
convey the “same” information differently. For example, decisionmakers 
asked to evaluate whether a particular accused product infringes a visually 
claimed design are likely to compare the designs holistically, whereas those 
asked to compare the accused product to a verbally claimed design might 
compare the designs in a more piecemeal fashion to match corresponding 
parts. A visual claim can thereby lead a decisionmaker to overlook 
differences between designs that the same decisionmaker would regard as 
pertinent were the claim verbal instead. 
Amy Adler and Rebecca Tushnet have both written about courts’ 
interpretations of images, and particularly the differential legal treatment 
that images receive, as compared to text, for the First Amendment and 
copyright purposes.268 As Tushnet observes: 
Copyright oscillates between two positions on nontextual creative works such 
as images: they are either transparent, or they are opaque. When courts treat 
images as transparent, they deny that interpretation is necessary, claiming 
that images merely replicate reality, so that the meaning of an image is so 
obvious that it admits of no serious debate.269 
By contrast, Tushnet notes, “[w]hen [courts] treat images as opaque, they deny 
that interpretation is possible because images are so far from being susceptible to 
discussion and analysis using words that there is no point in trying.”270 
Design patent jurisprudence reflects the simplified view of images, as 
courts caution against describing claims verbally, suggesting that the images 
 
266 See supra Section I.A. 
267 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 690-92 (“Images are more vivid and 
engaging than mere words, decreasing our capacity to assess images critically because we are more 
involved in reacting to them.”); accord NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON 
DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 7 (2009) 
(“With words, we can’t get the idea without getting to the end of the spoken or written thought. 
With pictures . . . we can stop ‘reading’ when we think we recognize the subject matter  . . . .”). 
268 See Amy Adler, The First Amendment and the Second Commandment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 41, 
42 (2013) [hereinafter Adler, First Amendment]; Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 687. 
269 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 686-87. 
270 Id. at 687. 
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speak for themselves or cannot be reduced to words.271 Yet, as Adler and 
Tushnet each lay bare in their work, “[w]e are vulnerable to the treachery of 
images” because they “appear to us to resemble unmediated reality more than 
words do.”272 Because of our tendency to treat pictures as reality, we might be 
prone to overlook the ways pictures can be cropped, expanded, or 
manipulated to emphasize certain features over others.273 This is especially 
worrisome because we process pictures holistically and quickly.274 
At the same time, as the design patent cases reflect, courts and other legal 
actors cannot help but resort to words, at the very least because they must 
explain their reasoning.275 As Neal Feigenson and Christina Speisel observe: 
Law, like most disciplines or practices that aspire to rationality, has tended to 
identify that rationality (and hence its virtue) with texts rather than pictures, 
with reading words rather than “reading” pictures, to the point that it is often 
thought that thinking in words is the only kind of thinking there is.276 
But verbal description isn’t always neutral; indeed, forcing verbal 
articulation can actually alter perception of objects or images, a phenomenon 
referred to as “verbal overshadowing.”277 
 
271 See supra Section I.A. 
272 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
accord Adler, First Amendment, supra note 268, at 43; see FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 267, at 
8-9; WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE: VISUAL TRUTH IN THE POST-
PHOTOGRAPHIC ERA 24 (1992). 
273 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 694, 726; see also FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, 
supra note 267, at 9-10. As William Mitchell explains in analyzing photography, “[s]electing a station 
point, framing the scene, and choosing the moment to expose are all intentional acts [by a 
photographer].” MITCHELL, supra note 272, at 29; accord id. at 202 (“Traditionally, photographers 
have tendentiously effaced and elided, when they wished to do so, through carefully selective framing 
and cropping and through use of camera angles in which foreground objects occlude unwanted 
background objects.”). 
274 See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 267, at 7; Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra 
note 93, at 690-92. 
275 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 734; cf. Roland Barthes, The Photographic 
Message, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 15, 18-19 (Stephen Heath ed. & trans., 1977) (“[T]o describe [a 
photograph] is thus not simply to be imprecise or incomplete, it is to change structures, to signify 
something different to what is shown.”). This can be so extreme that, as Jennifer Mnookin notes that 
before the era of photography, “[i]n reports of patent cases, the reporters sometimes apologized for 
the inclusion of drawings in their report.” Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic 
Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 61 (1998). 
276 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 267, at 4. 
277 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 734-35. Verbal overshadowing is 
something that experts can resist but nonexperts cannot. Id. at 735-36. 
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Perhaps, for example, Taco Cabana’s color-neutral verbal description of its 
trade dress led the courts and jurors involved in that case to de-emphasize the 
restaurants’ actual colors in adjudging similarity and consumer confusion.278 
All of this amounts to a lot of confusion in our design protection regimes. 
Visual exemplar claims—whether in design patents, trademark registrations, 
or designs in the marketplace—are always supplemented in litigation by some 
degree of verbal claiming. This verbal claiming can helpfully focus attention 
on certain features, or it can distract from other pertinent features. Legal 
actors need to be expressly conditioned to recognize the biases of images and 
texts, which evidence shows can dislodge many of those biases.279 
As we explore in the next section, the mixture of visual and verbal claims 
can drive a wedge between the notice the public receives from an exemplar 
claim pre-litigation and the verbal characterizations that flow later in 
litigation. Variation in claim form is also connected to claim scope, given the 
different ways in which images depicting a design and words describing the 
“same” design communicate to an audience.280 
*      *      * 
This Section demonstrates that each of the three design protection 
regimes comprises a system of central claiming that allows claiming at 
multiple points in time and mixes visual and verbal claiming, though to 
varying degrees. As a result, claimants can assert different, perhaps 
conflicting, claims for the same design even within a particular protection 
regime. This has further important consequences for adequacy of notice and 
claim scope, to which we turn respectively in the next two Sections. 
C. Adequacy of Notice 
The primary purpose of intellectual property claims is, as one of us has 
written, “to give notice to the public of the extent of the set of protected 
embodiments so as to encourage efficient investment in innovation, thereby 
fostering [the] law’s overarching goal of stimulating” creation.281 Yet the 
adequacy of the notice provided by the design claims in any one legal regime 
is affected by several claiming features. 
As we discussed above, four features in particular create the potential for 
a multiplicity of claims282: central claiming, often by exemplar rather than by 
 
278 See id. at 737 (“[I]n [a copyright] infringement case, the ways in which the witnesses and 
lawyers talk about the works at issue and direct factfinders’ attention to specific features will quite 
literally change how the factfinders see the works.”). 
279 Id. at 738 n.249. 
280 See infra Section II.D. 
281 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 721; accord Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 226, at 544-54. 
282 See supra Section II.B. 
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characteristic; the timing of claiming; the level of generality at which claims 
can be made; and the extent to which there is a choice between verbal and 
visual claiming. These features also affect notice, and we analyze each in turn. 
We then discuss how clearer distinctions between claimed, unclaimed, and 
disclaimed design features would help improve notice. 
The potential multiplicity of claims within any of the design protection 
regimes can, at least as currently implemented, undermine the adequacy of 
notice as to the scope of protection. If reconfigured, however, the multiplicity 
of claims could instead improve the adequacy of notice. 
Poor notice is primarily a result of parties’ inability to assess which claims 
take priority over other possibly conflicting claims. When more than one 
claim is made to a protected design, one of those claims might seem to cover 
a particular design while others might not. For example, claims might be 
made at multiple points in time. The earlier claim might specify a color for a 
restaurant exterior, and the later claim might not. Alternatively, multiple 
central claims might be made, irrespective of time: perhaps one to the design 
of a game requiring just skill and another to designs of games that require 
only luck. Or a central claim by exemplar, rendered visually, might be 
supplemented by a central claim by characteristic, made verbally: an image of 
a mostly pink restaurant exterior supplemented by a verbal description of a 
restaurant that doesn’t mention color at all, or that refers to “festive colors” 
but does not specify pink. Or one can imagine multiple claims presented at 
varying levels of generality—one with the excruciating detail of Varsity 
Brands’ description to the Copyright Office and another with a more general 
description referring only to lines, zigzags, and colorblocking. 
These multiple claims are problematic in that a third party’s design could 
seem to fall within the scope of one claim but not the others. Does the 
corresponding design right cover anything that falls within the scope of any 
of the multiple claims made to it, as in utility patent law?283 Does a 
later/earlier/broader/narrower/verbal/visual claim instead take precedence?284 
Or is the relation between multiple claims yet more complicated than that? 
Without a framework to address these questions, the fundamental notice 
function of intellectual property claims285 is severely undermined. 
Some of the design protection regimes provide partial answers regarding 
priority among multiple claims. Design patent doctrine makes clear that the 
 
283 E.g., Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 731-41. 
284 Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (“The classic 
judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to make sense in 
combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the 
implications of a later statute. . . . [A] specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should 
control our construction of the [earlier] statute . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
285 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 761-67. 
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visual design patent claim takes precedence over any later verbal claims made 
in litigation. But as we discussed above, despite the formal emphasis on the 
visual, courts dealing with virtually every validity or infringement question 
inevitably engage in verbal description.286 Trademark doctrine prioritizes the 
context in which the trade dress is used in the marketplace, even over the 
form of any (optional) registration.287 Copyright law provides no guidance 
whatsoever. None of the regimes gives anything close to a comprehensive 
sense of how to resolve these conflicts. In fact, none of the regimes seems 
even to recognize that the potential multiple claims can raise conflicts that 
undermine the adequacy of notice. And courts’ inconsistencies in choosing 
among claims, say with regard to level of generality, do not help matters. The 
lack of methodology also undermines notice by making it difficult for courts 
to be consistent in their interpretations. 
The lack of methodology is a shame because, in our view, multiple claims 
could, if implemented well, improve rather than impede notice. As one of us 
has analyzed, multiple central claims to the same work can help third parties 
understand the work’s scope by providing multiple vantage points from which 
to construct that understanding.288 Relatedly, informational redundancies can 
help communicate the salient features of a particular design through 
“repetition of information [across multiple claims] so that it can be 
reconstructed even [if single claims] cannot be retrieved or comprehended.”289 
In fact, in spite of its apparent inefficiency, redundancy pervades human 
communication, thereby aiding in comprehension.290 
That design claims are central also affects the adequacy of notice. Despite 
the widespread belief that peripheral claiming provides better notice of the 
scope of rights, in some cases central claiming might instead provide better, 
or at least equivalent, notice. Peripheral claims can be written with greater 
ambiguity to make them broader. The Lisa Frank claim we discussed 
previously,291 for example, might be seen as an attempted peripheral claim, 
 
286 See supra Section I.A. 
287 See supra Section I.B. 
288 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 761-67. 
289 Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 226, at 573-79; accord John M. Golden, Redundancy: 
When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 677-78 (2016) [hereinafter Golden, Redundancy] 
(“[C]laim drafters are commonly engaged in an engineering exercise that deliberately introduces 
redundancy . . . to try to protect against any of a number of ‘stresses’ or ‘failures’—invalidity 
challenges, relatively narrow claim constructions, etc.—that can later afflict the language that they 
use.”); cf. Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1105, 1157-61 (2003) (making comparable observations with regard to property claims). 
290 See Fromer, Information Theory, supra note 49, at 85-91 (positing how copyright law can 
be explained from the perspective of information theory and redundancy in communication); 
Golden, Redundancy, supra note 289, at 658, 660-61. 
291 Supra Section I.B. 
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yet it was both long and abstract, perhaps undermining any notice value of 
the claim. Additionally, because designing consists essentially of visual 
drafting, a comprehensive set of visual peripheral claims is impracticable.292 
Central claiming is therefore likely preferable to peripheral claiming for 
design claims, not only because of peripheral claiming’s defects, but also 
because central claiming has some distinct advantages. Pertinently, cognitive 
science research suggests that central claims correspond better to categorical 
learning.293 And sometimes a central claim made at a particular moment in 
time can helpfully focus attention on features that are relevant to the 
circumstances, or even the dispute, at hand.294 
Still, notice can often be undermined by the fact of multiple central 
claims, possibly made at different points in time, that appear to suggest 
differing scopes.295 One thing that might ameliorate this concern to some 
extent would be a requirement that a note accompany each formal design 
claim specifying that the claim is not exhaustive—essentially putting third 
parties on notice of potential multiplicity. 
With regard to claiming by exemplar or by characteristic, in general “when 
intellectual property law is protecting a small, poorly differentiated category, 
claiming by exemplar would be appropriate. But claiming by characteristic would 
be more suitable for larger, better differentiated categories, though claiming by 
exemplar might also play a role in teaching categorical boundaries.”296 
That said, context matters. Design is inherently visual, more so than many 
other types of matter protected by intellectual property rights. It would 
therefore be difficult to imagine a design claiming system that did not at least 
include visuals. In any system that does not limit infringement to identical 
reproduction of a design in every detail, it is difficult to conceive of visual 
claims as claims by characteristic. Thus, it seems unlikely that notice would 
be effective in the design context without exemplar claiming, even if claiming 
by characteristic can be more helpful for notice generally. For this reason, 
claiming by exemplar should be seen as a given in design protection regimes. 
What can be optimized with regard to notice is the precise form of visual 
exemplar claiming, and any supplementation of claiming by characteristic. 
Identification of characteristics—even if within a system of central 
claiming under which the listed characteristics are prototypical rather than 
necessary or sufficient—helpfully supplements visual claiming by directing 
 
292 See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 728 tbl.1. 
293 Id. at 761-65. 
294 The Second Circuit’s interpretation of Louboutin’s claim, particularly its emphasis on the 
contrasting red sole, comes to mind here. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
295 Supra subsection II.B.1. 
296 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 766. 
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parties to the more relevant characteristics in an exemplar. It might otherwise 
be difficult to adduce which design characteristics are most important. 
The mix of visual and verbal claiming affects notice in another way. As 
discussed above, visual claims tend to be interpreted holistically, whereas 
verbal claims instead focus attention—or distract attention away from—
particular features.297 Both claim formats can distort, standing alone. Courts 
have often recognized that fact, which is why they sometimes emphasize the 
visual—reflecting concern that parties will omit or unduly emphasize certain 
design features—and sometimes prioritize the verbal—out of concern parties 
will abstract away from the protectable features. But alternating emphasis 
misses the opportunity to develop a more holistic claiming methodology that 
would in all cases combine elements of visual and verbal claiming, perhaps at 
least by requiring verbal disclaiming, to draw attention to features that are 
not part of the claim. 
Adequacy of notice is also a function of when third parties learn of a 
design’s existence and when they learn that the designer claims rights in the 
design. A third party might see a design in the marketplace but have little 
reason to know that anyone claims rights in it, let alone which features are 
claimed. Obviously, by the time any litigation starts, third parties will know 
of both the design and the claim of rights. And when the design is 
registered—as it must be for design patents and as it can be for trademarks 
and copyright—the public is constructively on notice that the owner claims 
some rights in the design. But for unregistered trademarks or copyrights, 
third parties might have knowledge of the design but not of any particular 
assertion of rights to it. Linking knowledge of the existence of a design to the 
observation that the designer might assert rights in aspects of the design is 
not always trivial, especially when the design is a composite, as is typical.298 
At the time a design patent issues,299 the public is on notice of both the 
design and a claim of rights. By that time, depending on the industry, there 
is a reasonable chance the claimant’s design has been commercialized.300 In 
 
297 Supra subsection II.B.3. 
298 Supra text accompanying notes 135–37. 
299 On average, design patents issue twenty months after filing. Supra text accompanying note 61. 
300 This might be more likely to be true of, say, fashion designs as compared with computer 
hardware designs, given differences in business cycles, although much depends on when design patent 
applications are filed in that business cycle. See ELAINE CHEN, BRINGING A HARDWARE PRODUCT 
TO MARKET: NAVIGATING THE WILD RIDE FROM CONCEPT TO MASS PRODUCTION 1-4 (2015) 
(explaining that the business cycle of hardware products is “long and costly” as it can take years to 
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designs to their stores every four to six weeks). 
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general, then, both claiming and public notice of a claim of rights in a design 
happen relatively early for design patents. 
But that is less true for trademark or copyright rights in design. When 
the rights are unregistered, there is little or no public notice of the claims. 
Notice is not significantly improved even when those rights are registered 
because courts do not understand the claims within these registrations to bind 
rightsholders in their assertion of rights.301 
If notice were the only concern, the obvious solution here would be to require 
early, binding claiming. But there are some good reasons to de-emphasize 
registration in the trademark and copyright contexts. In particular, mandatory 
registration raises the cost of protection for designers and can work as a trap for 
the unwary, preventing designers from acquiring rights when they inadvertently 
fail to register in a timely fashion.302 Moreover, because American trademark law 
connects rights in a design to its use in the marketplace, early notice might not 
always be possible because the rights depend on consumers’ association of the 
design features with a particular source, and consumer understanding can change 
as marketplace conditions evolve.303 
One way to improve the quality of notice would be to make it easier for 
third parties to distinguish between a design’s claimed, unclaimed, and 
disclaimed aspects. For example, consider the broken lines that might be 
found in a design patent claim. Matter depicted in broken lines is technically 
unclaimed.304 Yet to the uninitiated, this matter might appear to be claimed 
matter that narrows the scope of protection in the design.305 Or it might seem 
to be disclaimed. We think it would be useful to have a third mode of 
depiction for disclaimed matter, or at least a verbal supplement to disclaim 
matter within a visual depiction. Verbal supplementation might be especially 
effective here because verbal claiming by its nature tends to focus attention 
on specific features—exactly as one would want disclaimers to do. 
D. Claim Scope and Litigation Framing306 
In addition to providing notice, claims are critical to framing virtually 
every aspect of intellectual property litigation. Every infringement action 
involves an allegation that the defendant has violated the plaintiff ’s rights in 
the claimed design. As a result, the first thing a court must do is figure out 
 
301 See supra Sections I.B–C. 
302 Sprigman, supra note 184, at 491-93 (describing the high costs of compliance in early 
American copyright law). 
303 See supra Section I.B. 
304 See supra Section I.A. 
305 When assessing design patent scope, even someone familiar with design patent claiming 
conventions might subconsciously, or mistakenly, include matter in broken lines. 
306 Portions of this section are adapted from Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28. 
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what the claimed design is. Only then can the court determine whether the 
claimed property is subject to valid rights because all of the relevant validity 
doctrines in design patent, trademark, and copyright assess the validity of 
the design as claimed. 
One significant part of the validity determination in every design 
protection regime is a comparison of the claimed design with what came 
before it. Almost all intellectual property regimes premise protection on 
some form of novelty—the invention or creation of a new thing the world has 
not seen before.307 But truly new creations are rare things. Almost all creators 
add their contributions onto a base of prior knowledge. And, for various 
policy reasons, intellectual property regimes refuse to protect some features, 
no matter how different they might be from what preceded them. For 
example, although they each understand functionality differently, none of the 
three design protection regimes will protect functional features. 
At the same time, all intellectual property regimes recognize that a party 
can own some valid rights in a work even when many features of the work are 
not protectable. One can, for example, get a utility patent on an invention 
that incorporates many elements of prior inventions, as long as the newly 
claimed invention adds some novel and nonobvious element.308 Utility patent 
law refers to the features that make an invention patentable collectively as the 
“point of novelty.”309 Design patent law also used to incorporate the concept 
of the “point of novelty,” and although the Federal Circuit has since rejected 
the terminology, it still evaluates a claimed design in light of prior art. 
Copyright and trademark lack a similar term, but they have the same concept: 
those features that are new and are not excluded from protection for policy 
reasons can be the basis of protection for a work as a whole, but that which 
was taken from the prior art or otherwise excluded from protection cannot be 
protected separately. Thus, one important purpose of defining the relevant 
 
307 Even trademark law, which does not require novelty per se, typically awards rights to the 
party that first uses a mark in connection with particular goods or services. See supra Section I.B. 
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strong evidence of copying. E.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If, 
therefore, two works are so similar as to make it highly probable that the later one is a copy of the 
earlier one . . . .”). More importantly, the scope of copyright protection in a work that is identical to 
other preexisting works would be vanishingly small. The plaintiff would have to prove that the 
defendant’s work was copied from the plaintiff rather than from the preexisting work. 
308 Cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (“[A] patent composed of 
several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, 
independently, known in the prior art.”). 
309 See Lemley, Point of Novelty, supra note 87, at 1254-55 (discussing the role of the “point of 
novelty” in patent law). 
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design is to determine which features of the claimed design are protectable, 
and whether valid rights attach in relation to a unit of the claimed scope.310 
Once we know what the rightsholder has in fact contributed to the world, 
we can ask what acts violate rights in that property. Every intellectual 
property system determines infringement by reference to both the acts that 
cannot be undertaken in relation to the subject of intellectual property rights 
and the level of similarity between the defendant’s invention, work, or mark 
and that of the plaintiff.311 Together, the prohibited acts and the requisite 
similarity determine the legal scope of a party’s rights. That legal scope is 
inextricably intertwined with the delineation of the entitlement, which is 
inescapably anchored by the claims. When we, for example, say that the 
defendant must publicly display “the copyrighted work,” we take for granted 
that we have already been able to define “the copyrighted work” so that we 
can connect our analysis of similarity to that work. Further, we generally 
mean that the defendant must have taken the thing that gives the intellectual 
property right its validity—the point of novelty, in patent terms. The marks 
“Shake Shack” and “Joe’s Crab Shack” might share the word “shack,” but that 
fact alone should not cause the newcomer to be guilty of trademark 
infringement, for the simple reason that the word “shack” alone is not what 
justifies protecting the trademark. 
Determination of the scope of a party’s rights therefore necessarily 
depends on a definition of the relevant intellectual property. More 
particularly, evaluating whether the defendant’s use comes within the legal 
scope of the plaintiff ’s rights requires identification of the protectable 
elements of those rights. This is because all intellectual property regimes 
require, at least in theory, not just similarity between the defendant’s and 
plaintiff ’s works but similarity between the allegedly infringing work and the 
protectable elements of the plaintiff ’s work.312 Infringement inquiries in 
every area therefore depend in the first instance on the ability to determine 
what a party has claimed. A court simply cannot run any of the relevant 
doctrines except in relation to the claimed design. To the extent claiming 
methodology interferes with clarity or enables parties to emphasize different 
features at different times, the effects are pervasive and fundamental. 
 
310 See Michael J. Madison, IP Things as Boundary Objects: The Case of Copyright Work, 6 LAWS 
13, 13-14 (2017) (examining the ways that boundaries on protectable works may be “less distinct than 
they appear”); Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 381, 397-98 (2005) (discussing the “broadening array” of potentially protectable things). 
311 Fromer & Lemley, Audience, supra note 190, at 1251. 
312 In addition, different information might be available in each design protection regime 
to assess protectability, scope, and infringement. Pertinently, design patents list prior art 
references. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2017). There is no comparable information for copyrights and 
trademarks, even registered ones. 
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E. Internalizing Validity and Scope 
Intellectual property doctrines fall into three basic categories: validity, 
infringement, and defenses.313 Each intellectual property regime tends to 
separate doctrines into these three legal categories, often applying different 
burdens of proof and asking different actors to decide issues in each 
category.314 As a result of that separation, parties treat intellectual property 
rights “like a nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any 
direction.”315 When infringement is at issue, intellectual property owners 
tout the breadth of their rights, while accused infringers seek to cabin them 
within narrow bounds.316 When it comes to validity, however, the parties 
reverse their positions: intellectual property owners emphasize the 
narrowness of their rights to avoid having those rights held invalid, and 
accused infringers argue the reverse.317 Courts often have difficulty 
managing that strategic behavior and holding the scope of rights constant 
for validity and infringement purposes. 
Take, for example, Reynolds Consumer Products v. Handi-Foil Corp.318 In 
that case, Reynolds objected to the packaging of a new line of Handi-Foil 
aluminum-foil products.319 Reynolds claimed to own rights in the “overall 
look, feel and commercial impression of its Reynolds Wrap packaging 
design.”320 Specifically, Reynolds identified at least twelve elements that 
make up this unregistered trade dress: 
(a) the color scheme; (b) the use of the color scheme; (c) the use of 
prominent lettering within the blue section; (d) the use of silver bands to 
separate the blue and pink sections; (e) the placement of the quantity 
information; (f) the inclusion of the “made in the U.S.A.” lettering; (g) the 
repetition of the color scheme and type on the ends of the boxes; (h) the 
“press here to lock” feature at the ends of the boxes; (i) the use of graphics 
with how-to information; (j) the “Lift” graphic; (k) the positioning of the 
 
313 See Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2219 (discussing the “separation between 
validity, infringement, and defenses” in intellectual property cases). 
314 Id. at 2220-23. 
315 White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886). 
316 See Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2225-66 (“IP owners will argue in the 
infringement proceedings that their right is quite broad . . . only to turn around and argue in validity 
proceedings that their right is quite narrow . . . . Accused infringers will do the reverse.”). 
317 Id. In the German patent context, this phenomenon is referred as the “Angora cat” because 
in infringement proceedings the patent resembles a blow-dried fluffy cat, and in invalidity 
proceedings, the same cat looks like a little wet rolled-up bundle. Colleen Chien & Christian 
Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 16) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601562). 
318 No. 13-0214, 2014 WL 3615853 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2014). 
319 See id. at *1. 
320 Id. at *7. 
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brand name on the top flap of the box; and (l) the color yellow, placement, 
and text used to caution the consumer.321 
In evaluating Reynolds’ claim, the court never addressed validity, let alone 
identified the features that made the Reynolds trade dress protectable.322 It 
simply engaged in a side-by-side comparison of Handi-Foil’s and Reynolds’s 
packages, shown in Figure 21, which was enough for the court to conclude 
that “the similarity between the overall impressions” was “striking.”323 What 
were the damning similarities? 
 
Figure 21: Reynolds and Handi-Foil Packages324 
 
[T]he two boxes both say “non-stick” and “heavy duty.” The Reynolds box 
says “foods lift right off!” and the Handi-Foil box says “Food Easily Lifts 
Off!” Both boxes place the (identical) square footage on the right end of the 
box, with the metric conversions typed neatly below. Additionally, the two-
dimensional images above cannot capture the similarity of the boxes’ side and 
end panels, all of which bear striking semblance. Add to these characteristics 
the “Made in USA” language on the right portion of the boxes . . . .325 
These elements of similarity, and the court’s belief that Handi-Foil 
attempted to mimic the Reynolds Wrap box to enter the aluminum-foil 
market, convinced the court that the jury’s finding of trade dress 
infringement was reasonable.326 In fact, according to the court, “any other 
finding may well have been unreasonable.”327 
 
321 Id. 
322 Id. at *8. 
323 Id. at *9. 
324 Second Amended Complaint at 6, 9, Reynolds, No. 13-0214, 2014 WL 3615853. 
325 Reynolds, 2014 WL 3615853, at *9. 
326 See id. at *9-10 (“[T]he reasonableness of the jury’s trade dress verdict [has] become[] obvious.”). 
327 Id. at *9. 
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The problem with this conclusion is that the elements of similarity noted 
by the court were not even elements of the trade dress articulated by 
Reynolds, very likely because those elements almost certainly were not things 
Reynolds was entitled to own. Phrases like “Food Easily Lifts Off” and 
“Made in the USA” are descriptive, so any rights Reynolds owned in relation 
to the phrases must have been related to the particular stylization, which 
Handi-Foil did not copy. When one limits the trade dress in the Reynolds 
Wrap packaging to the sorts of things Reynolds is legally entitled to own, the 
similarities disappear. Because, however, the court never definitively 
determined the features of the claimed design, it could not hold the scope of 
Reynolds’ rights constant across both validity and infringement analyses. 
One of us previously attributed the “nose of wax” problem to the lack of 
an integrated procedure for deciding the proper scope of a party’s rights.328 
Yet the flexibility and multiplicity of claims, a particularly serious problem in 
the context of design, enables inconsistency and makes it much more difficult 
for courts to constrain the parties. That is how, for example, Varsity Brands 
could claim its cheerleading uniform designs sufficiently narrowly to the 
Copyright Office—to establish validity—and then later in litigation claim its 
designs more broadly to capture Star Athletica’s designs.329 Yet a design ought 
to be one and the same, whether validity or infringement is at issue.330 
*      *      * 
This Part shows that the choices each design protection system makes 
regarding claiming methodology have significant consequences. Those choices 
influence claim timing and the amount and content of information available 
to shape the claim, the elasticity and multiplicity of claims, the adequacy of 
notice provided by the claims, claim scope and litigation framing, and the 
extent to which parties can strategically manage validity and scope. The 
claiming methodologies adopted by each design protection regime give reason 
for concern about the adequacy of notice because they all allow rightsholders 
to claim strategically at different moments in time. These methodologies also 
enable parties to avoid internalizing their claiming choices across validity and 
scope inquiries, as intellectual property laws ought to do. To address these 
concerns, design protection regimes should encourage earlier claiming where 
plausible, construct a set of rules to decide how to prioritize between 
conflicting claims, communicate clearly that central claims need not be 
exhaustive so as not to mislead third parties, devise a standard to distinguish 
 
328 Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2200-02. 
329 Supra section I.C. 
330 See Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2267 (“Our aim should be to find the proper 
scope for an IP right. And that can’t be done if we consider validity, infringement, and defenses in 
isolation.”). 
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between claimed, unclaimed, and disclaimed matter, and emphasize the 
constancy of claim scope across both validity and infringement analyses. 
III. OVERLAPPING PROTECTION AND CLAIMING DESIGN 
In this Part, we address the relationship between the varied claiming 
systems in design patent, trademark, and copyright, along with the issue of 
overlapping protection. After describing the way parties use these various 
forms of protection cumulatively or as substitutes, we argue that overlapping 
protection aggravates many of the concerns we described above about the 
multiplicity of claiming methodologies, particularly by further weakening 
notice. We then argue that the differences in claiming methodologies may in 
some cases exacerbate the overlap problem, by enabling parties to game 
limiting doctrines and by disguising the extent to which claims are really 
directed to the same design. 
A. Overlapping Protection for Design 
What is worth emphasizing about Puma’s dispute with Forever 21 over 
the bow slides is that Puma asserted design patent, trademark, and 
copyright rights in the exact same design.331 That sort of claiming is far from 
unique—parties often can, and frequently do, claim multiple forms of 
protection for the exact same designs, or at least designs that consist in 
substantial part of the same features. They use these different forms of 
protection cumulatively or as substitutes for each other even though each 
regime has a somewhat different purpose. 
For a recent example of cumulative claiming, consider Spectrum Diversified 
Design’s complaint against Target for infringing Spectrum’s rights in its Tovolo 
Sphere Ice Molds, shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
331 See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. 
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Figure 22: Tovolo and Target Ice Molds332 
 
According to Spectrum, Target’s Ice Mold infringes its design patent, 
shown in Figure 23, and its trade dress in the design of the Sphere Ice 
Molds.333 Spectrum described its trade dress as having a unique design that 
corresponds to the shape depicted in its design patent, but also including “a 
clear plastic mold base with two swirled-looking lines with the Tovolo® 
trademark in the middle and a gray plastic mold top with grooves, lines, 
ridges, and a wagon wheel design.”334 
 
Figure 23: Claim in Spectrum’s Design Patent335 
 
One important reason parties are often motivated to assert both design 
patent and trademark claims has to do with potential remedies. Specifically, 
parties cumulate claims in search of comprehensive remedies that neither 
system readily provides on its own. A finding of design patent infringement 
almost inevitably leads to an award of damages, which can be substantial, but 
 
332 Complaint at 5, Spectrum Diversified Design, LLC v. Target Corp., No. 18-00133 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 29, 2018). 
333 Id. at 5-6. 
334 Id. at 4. 
335 U.S. Patent No. D731,264 fig.1. 
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it does not always result in an injunction.336 A finding of trademark 
infringement, by contrast, usually leads to injunctive relief, but not always 
damages.337 Parties therefore sometimes assert both design patent and 
trademark claims so they can get the best of both worlds: damages on their 
design patent claim and injunctive relief on their trademark claim. 
For an example of substitutive claiming, consider Govino’s complaint against 
GoVerre.338 In that case, Govino alleged that it owns several design patents 
covering the design of a wine glass, but notably, Govino didn’t assert design 
patent infringement, presumably because GoVerre’s glasses were not similar 
enough to infringe the design patents.339 Instead, Govino alleged trade dress 
infringement, arguing that its design patents prove the designs are ornamental.340 
Govino’s claim against GoVerre also shows how parties’ cumulative or 
substitutive use of these different regimes enables them to game the different 
substantive rules in trademark, design patent, and copyright laws. In Govino’s 
case, it attempted to avoid the relatively stricter design patent infringement 
standard while benefitting from design patent’s relatively weaker 
functionality doctrine, pointing to the design patents to establish trademark 
nonfunctionality.341 To the extent claiming methodologies allow parties to use 
these regimes cumulatively or as effective substitutes, the policy goals 
underlying strong boundary-policing doctrines may be frustrated. 
 
336 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (emphasizing that 
injunctive relief for patent infringement should not be automatically granted); Mark A. Lemley, A 
Rational System of Design Patent Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 219, 221-24 (2013) (setting out and 
analyzing the generous damages provision for design patent infringement). 
337 See Mark A. Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1795, 1796 (2017) (“Trademark cases should take account of the true equities of trademark cases 
. . . . Doing so will not mean that trademark owners always win injunctions, but it should make it 
more common, at least in the core cases in which confusion is a real risk.”); Mark A. Thurmon, 
Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 247-51 (2010) 
(indicating that damages are not awarded as a matter of course following a finding of trademark 
infringement); Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringement, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627, 
628 (2016) (arguing that courts should not always issue injunctions). 
338 Complaint, Govino, LLC v. Goverre, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-01237 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2017). 
339 Id. at 3. 
340 Id. at 3, 12. 
341 Trademark law polices functionality aggressively, denying trademark protection to features 
whenever they are not arbitrary or fanciful vis-à-vis the article’s function (that is, when they 
contribute to function in any meaningful degree). See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 
532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 990-92 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
rev’d on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, 
Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 503-09 (6th Cir. 2013). Design patent, by contrast, rarely disqualifies features 
from protection on functionality grounds, doing so only when those features represent the only way 
of achieving a functional result. Apple, 786 F.3d at 992. 
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B. Exacerbating Notice Problems 
Even if we only think about each of these areas of law protecting design in 
isolation, the claiming issues we have described create significant notice and 
scope problems. But it would be a mistake to consider them only in isolation 
because it is so common for parties to assert multiple forms of rights for the 
same design. As a result, would-be users, licensees, and courts have to evaluate 
the scope of rights across multiple systems. That can be quite difficult. Even 
when a party appears to claim rights in the same design and asserts its various 
rights against the same allegedly infringing products, the design patent, 
trademark, and copyright claims—not to mention the underlying substantive 
laws—are not obviously identical. 
In the well-known dispute between Apple and Samsung over the 
iPhone, for example, Apple asserted both design patent and trade dress 
rights.342 There was considerable overlap in terms of the Samsung devices 
that Apple contended infringed its various rights. Apple’s claimed trade 
dress seemed to be for the same Apple devices that Apple contended 
embodied its patented designs. And the parties and the courts that 
considered Apple’s claims treated them as if the overlap was essentially 
complete. But compare Apple’s visual design patent claim with its different 
verbal description of its unregistered trade dress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Apple Visual Design Patent Claim and Verbal Description of 
Unregistered Trade Dress343 
 
Design Patent Unregistered Trade Dress 
 
342 See Apple, 786 F.3d at 989-91. 
343 Id. at 992, 997. 
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a rectangular product with four 
evenly rounded corners; 
a flat, clear surface covering 
the front of the product; 
a display screen under the 
clear surface; 
substantial black borders 
above and below the display 
screen and narrower black 
borders on either side of the 
screen; and 
when the device is on, a row 
of small dots on the display 
screen, a matrix of colorful square 
icons with evenly rounded 
corners within the display screen, 
and an unchanging bottom dock 
of colorful square icons with 
evenly rounded corners set off 
from the display’s other icons. 
 
Deckers’ recent suit against H&M demonstrates even more clearly the 
uncertainty created by different legal claims to a design.344 In that case, 
Deckers alleged that H&M infringed a design patent covering various aspects 
of the design of Deckers’ UGG boots, as shown in Figure 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Deckers’ Design Patents and Allegedly Infringing H&M 
Boots345  
 
344 Complaint at 1-2, Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., No. 17-00103 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017). 
345  Id. at 4, 8. 
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Deckers also claimed that H&M infringed its trade dress rights in the 
Bailey Boot, which it described as follows: 
• Classic suede boot styling made famous by the UGG® Brand; 
• Overlapping of front and rear panels on the lateral side of the boot shaft;  
• Curved top edges on the overlapping panels;  
• Exposed fleece-type lining edging the overlapping panels and top 
of the boot shaft; and  
• One or more buttons (depending on the height of the boot) 
prominently featured on the lateral side of the boot shaft adjacent 
the overlapping panels.346 
Deckers contended that the same H&M boots infringed both the 
design patent and the UGG trade dress.347 Indeed, it lined up its design 
patent drawing, its Bailey Button boot, and H&M’s accused boot side by 
side in its complaint, as shown in Figure 25. 
 
 
346 Id. at 5. 
347 Id. at 5, 8. 
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Figure 25: Deckers’ Design Patent, Deckers’ Boot, and Allegedly Infringing 
H&M Boot348 
 
There are, however, some interesting and notable differences between the 
design patent and trade dress claims. In some ways, the trade dress claim is 
broader than the design patent, referring, for example, to “one or more buttons” 
and leaving undefined the height of the boot.349 That is, the trade dress claim is 
to a line of boots—boots with different numbers of buttons and of different 
heights—and not to a particular boot design. The design patent by definition 
claims a particular boot design. At the same time, the trade dress claim is also 
conceivably narrower than the design patent in the sense that the trade dress 
claim refers to a fleece-type lining, whereas the design patent clearly shows some 
kind of lining but doesn’t identify a material.350 Because Deckers asserted both 
design patent and trade dress rights against the same commercial products, 
H&M had to layer the claims to determine the scope of Deckers’ rights. That 
effect is common. Indeed, Target will have to do the same thing with regard to 
Spectrum’s claims, which overlap substantially but not perfectly.351 
C. Obscuring Overlap 
Perhaps more subtly, the fact that a party’s claims to a particular design 
might take different forms even when they are meant to cover the same 
ground can obscure the extent of overlapping protection and perhaps lull 
courts into a sense of complacency about the problems of overlap. The visual 
claims in a design patent, for example, might focus courts on an overall 
impression of the design, and that might happen even if the drawing uses 
broken lines that technically limit the claim to particular features of the 
design. Verbal descriptions of trade dress, by contrast, might direct courts to 
specific features at the expense of overall impression. 
 
348 Id. at 8. 
349 Id. at 5. 
350 Id. at 8. 
351 See supra notes 332–34 and accompanying text. 
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These effects are likely most significant when the plaintiff has in fact 
asserted multiple forms of rights. However, it’s also possible that the 
persistence of different claim forms generally reduces courts’ sense that the 
various rights overlap. That sort of effect may be a partial explanation for the 
Seventh Circuit’s controversial decision in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.352 In that 
case, Moen claimed only trade dress rights in the design of its faucets, and 
Kohler defended in part by arguing that the court should not recognize trade 
dress rights in product design because it is the subject matter of design patent 
law.353 The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument,354 despite the Supreme 
Court’s repeated expressions of concern about overlapping trademark and 
patent rights, even in cases involving design patents.355 
According to the Seventh Circuit, there was nothing to worry about. 
Trademark rights are simply different from design patents because unlike 
design patents, “trademark protection for a product’s configuration does not 
create a monopoly in the use of the product’s shape.”356 Instead, the court 
insisted that “Kohler [was] free to copy Moen’s design so long as it insure[d] 
that the public [was] not thereby deceived or confused into believing that its 
copy [was] a Moen faucet.”357 
That distinction, as one of us has noted, was disingenuous, for the effect 
of trade dress protection was to deny Kohler the ability to copy Moen’s design 
for the purpose of competing with Moen in the market for faucets—in other 
words, in the context most likely to have economic significance.358 That 
Kohler was free to copy the design of Moen’s faucet as a sculpture hardly 
establishes that trade dress rights work no competitive harm. 
And precisely because Moen sought protection for the design of the faucet 
itself—rather than the name attached to the faucet or its packaging—the 
promise that Kohler was free to copy Moen’s design “so long as it insure[d] 
that the public [was] not thereby deceived” was an empty one.359 The whole 
point of seeking trade dress protection for product design features is to 
enforce those rights against others who copy the product features specifically, 
even when they do not copy word marks or packaging. Moen was not asking 
the court simply to require Kohler to label its faucets effectively (Kohler had 
already done that); it was asking the court to prevent Kohler from copying 
 
352 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993). 
353 Id. at 636-37. 
354 Id. at 644. 
355 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964). 
356 Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 n.10 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
357 Id. 
358 McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, supra note 6, at 843-45. 
359 Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 n.10. 
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the faucet’s design features because it contended that Kohler’s use of the same 
design features for its faucets was what was likely to create the confusion.360 
If Moen was right about that—if the confusion was caused by use of the 
design features themselves—then it was impossible for Kohler to use the design 
in a way that would ensure the public was not deceived. 
We don’t suggest that differences in the form of design patent and 
trademark claims completely explain Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc. or the other cases 
that follow its reasoning. But it’s entirely possible that a design patent claim’s 
inclusion of a faucet (even if some aspects were rendered in broken lines) 
encouraged the court to think of design patent claims as in-gross claims that 
differ from trade dress claims even when those claims are functionally 
equivalent. Moreover, we suspect that it is generally harder for courts to see 
the functional equivalence between these forms of protection because 
claiming methodology differs across areas of intellectual property. 
IV. FIXING CLAIMING VARIANCE 
Having described the substantial problems that can result from the use of 
such different—not to mention internally muddled361—claiming rules across 
the various areas of design protection, we now consider possible ways of 
addressing the relationship between claiming and overlapping protection. 
Two potential approaches stand out. For those who are convinced that 
overlapping rights are problematic—or that the claiming issues we describe 
make that overlap intolerable—the solution is to eliminate the overlap, either 
using doctrines of election or channeling doctrines. For those who are 
comfortable with overlap among the design protection regimes, we suggest a 
more targeted fix for claiming, namely the adoption of a transsubstantive 
claiming regime for design. There are different costs and benefits to each 
approach, which we consider in turn. 
A. Eliminating Overlap 
The most straightforward way to deal with the problems caused by the 
diverse claiming regimes for design would be to eliminate overlapping 
protection. If design claimants could avail themselves of only a single form of 
 
360 Id. at 633 (recounting the evidence that Moen introduced, which demonstrated the 
likelihood of source confusion). 
361 Earlier in this Article, we address a number of improvements to each claiming regime to 
restore internal order, including encouraging earlier claiming where plausible, constructing a set of 
rules to decide how to prioritize between conflicting claims, communicating clearly that central 
claims need not be exhaustive so as not to mislead third parties, devising a standard to distinguish 
between claimed, unclaimed, and disclaimed matter, and holding the scope of a design right constant 
across both validity and infringement analyses. Supra Part II. 
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protection, claiming methodology could not differ across protection regimes 
for the simple reason that only one claiming regime would govern. Although 
one would surely want to optimize the governing claiming regime, the 
mischief that derives from multiple design claiming systems would be avoided. 
Concerns about overlapping forms of protection typically are premised on 
the notion that a party’s ability to claim multiple forms of protection 
undermines the inherent, but different, bargains on which each form of 
protection is based.362 Whereas design patent law exists to encourage industrial 
design, trademark law fosters competition by preventing deceptive use of 
source indicators and copyright law aims to stimulate the creation and 
dissemination of works of authorship. Yet all three forms of protection are 
increasingly available for design.363 Despite significant doctrine reflecting 
concern about overlapping protection for functional features, modern courts 
and some commentators are more sanguine about overlapping forms of design 
protection. They reason that, so long as each area of law provides for protection 
on its own terms, creators should not have to choose among those rights.364 
We do not wade further here into the debate on the propriety of 
overlapping regimes. Instead, we describe two principal tools courts have 
used to manage overlap, to the extent it is a problem: doctrines of election 
and channeling doctrines. We discuss the benefits of each approach in turn. 
1. Doctrine of Election 
In the early twentieth century, courts routinely held that creators of works 
could elect just one form of intellectual property protection, even if they would 
seem to qualify for multiple forms.365 For example, in 1910, a circuit court ruled 
that even when a work—there, a watercolor painting of sprigs of holly, 
mistletoe, and spruce intended for use as wrapping paper—was potentially 
protectable under design patent or copyright, “the author or owner [must] 
decide[] under which statute he would protect his property.”366 The court 
reasoned that “[t]he method of procedure, the term of protection, and the 
penalties for infringement, are so different that the author . . . of a painting 
that is eligible for both classes must decide to which region of intellectual 
effort the work is to be assigned, and he must abide by the decision.”367 
 
362 See supra note 7. 
363 E.g., Heymann, Overlapping, supra note 7, at 242-46 (discussing how the boundaries between 
the different doctrines have developed over the years). 
364 See id. at 252-56 (“[A]lthough it was not the focus of the opinion, the Supreme Court lent its 
voice in 2000 to the chorus of courts finding no doctrinal issue with simultaneous intellectual property 
rights.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 205-08 (2000))). 
365 Id. 
366 Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150, 151 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910). 
367 Id. at 152. 
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During this period, courts similarly ruled that a designer had to elect 
between design patent and trademark protection, reasoning that allowing 
both forms of protection for the design “would result for all practical purposes 
in an extension of the design monopoly.”368 More recently, however, courts 
have rejected election, allowing qualifying creators to hold and enforce 
multiple forms of intellectual property with regard to the same creation.369 
One solution to the issues raised by design claiming would be to revitalize 
the doctrine of election for designs. Requiring a designer to choose only one 
of design patent, trademark, and copyright would ensure that the designer is 
thereby also choosing just one claiming regime, which would eliminate the 
notice problems attributable to varied claiming methodologies, and it would 
reduce the opportunity for strategic behavior.370 
A number of considerations affect the viability and value of a doctrine of 
election, particularly the timing and form of election, creator choice, and the 
subject of election. Consider first the timing and form of election. For 
election to simplify the claiming rules, parties must not initially be able to 
claim multiple forms of protection and only later be forced to decide which 
of the three forms of protection to enforce. That would allow most of the 
claiming problems we have described to persist until the moment of 
enforcement. A doctrine of election would therefore be most effective if it 
required an early election. 
Early election would improve the quality of notice and reduce strategic 
behavior. At the same time, designers might reasonably want to see how their 
designs fare in the marketplace before deciding whether, say, trademark 
protection is plausible, let alone optimal. Timing is further complicated by 
the fact that design patent applications typically must be filed relatively 
early, whereas copyright registration need only be sought at the point of 
enforcement and trademark registrations are not necessary at all.371 
 
368 In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927). 
369 E.g., In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“But the mere fact that the copyright 
will persist beyond the term of any design patent which may be granted does not provide a sound 
basis for rejecting appellant’s design patent application.”); see Beckerman-Rodau, Problem, supra note 
7, at 73 (“Most recent case law has allowed such simultaneous protection.”); Heymann, Overlapping, 
supra note 7, at 252-56; McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, supra note 7, at 847 (“[N]o one seems seriously 
to suggest that overlap between trademark and copyright law generally disqualifies copyrightable 
works from trademark protection.”); Samuelson, Strategies, supra note 7, at 1529. Some attribute the 
move to allowing multiple forms of overlapping protection to a general shift in attitude toward 
favoring the interests of intellectual property creators. Beckerman-Rodau, Problem, supra note 7, at 
88; Moffat, Mutant Copyrights, supra note 7, at 1496-97. One of us has advocated a return to the doctrine 
of election at the product level. Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 873, 890-94 (2009) [hereinafter McKenna, Alternate Approach]. 
370 Again, this assumes that each internal claiming regime is fixed to improve notice and 
remove possibilities for undesirable strategic behavior. 
371 Supra Part I. 
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Moreover, trademark rights will not even attach to designs until there has 
been use in the marketplace and distinctiveness established.372 Given these 
timing rules, designers would have to elect design patent protection 
relatively early or effectively elect against design patent. Given the 
uncertainty about whether, and when, secondary meaning might attach and 
the relatively more robust functionality exclusion in trademark law, that 
might create incentives for parties to choose copyright or design patent 
protection more often. As between those, copyright has the cost advantage 
(attaching at the moment of fixation and allowing registration to be 
deferred),373 but even after Star Athletica (and perhaps especially after Star 
Athletica), copyright protection for useful articles is uncertain. A doctrine of 
election could therefore have the effect of pushing more design to design 
patent, at least on the margin. 
If we assume that the incentives are not so strong as to effectively 
eliminate real choice, then there are both costs and benefits to allowing a 
designer to choose the form of protection for his or her design. As one of us 
has written, giving designers this choice has the benefit of recognizing that 
the designer “is in the best position to know where competitors are likely to 
find value.”374 That is, the designer is in a better position than anyone else—
perhaps including lawmakers—to decide whether, say, design patent’s shorter 
term but perhaps broader protections are desirable over copyright’s longer 
term but perhaps narrower protections, given the designer’s business strategy. 
That said, although the designer might be well-placed to optimize private 
benefits from protection, the designer’s choice might be a suboptimal form of 
protection from society’s point of view. If designers frequently choose forms 
of protection that are subpar for society, channeling doctrines might be a 
better solution than a doctrine of election.375 
There is one final complication to using a doctrine of election, and that 
has to do with its workability. To make a doctrine of election useful, courts 
(or, potentially, Congress) would need to determine which designs are subject 
to election. In our view, election should apply only to designs that fall within 
the subject matter of more than one of the three design protection regimes. 
Those are the designs for which overlapping protection is at issue. 
 
372 Supra Section I.B. 
373 A law requiring copyright registration—whether on the early side or otherwise—would run 
afoul of the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities as prerequisite to copyright protection. 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221. Legal provision of incentives to engage in formalities, however, are permissible. 
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing, supra note 184, at 494-99. 
374 McKenna, Alternate Approach, supra note 369, at 892. 
375 Infra subsection IV.A.2. 
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One challenge to identifying the relevant designs will be the imperfect 
mapping of claims in different formats, as in the Apple v. Samsung case 
discussed above.376 Courts in cases involving multiple claims will have to 
determine whether those claims really are to the same design. That 
determination is likely to be more difficult in a world of election because 
parties will have a greater incentive to vary the claims slightly in order to 
mask the extent of overlap. Even if that challenge is manageable within an 
individual case, the dynamic considerations are exponentially harder. 
Specifically, how will a court determine which designs are subject to election 
when the issue is not simply whether a party must elect a form of protection 
within a particular case, but whether that party asserting rights today 
regarding an ostensibly new design is really claiming a design for which 
different rights were previously elected in another context? 
Relatedly, a doctrine of election must specify how much of a design must 
be elected. That is, must a designer choose only one form of protection for 
the entire design? Or might the designer elect for, say, design patent 
protection for certain design elements but trade dress for others? We think 
that the doctrine of election should operate at the level of the design, or 
product, rather than piecemeal on design elements.377 Allowing a party to use 
different forms of protection for different elements of the same design would 
enable designers to game the doctrine of election and undermine its 
ameliorating effects. At the same time, a doctrine of election operating at the 
design level could sometimes raise difficult questions as to what constitutes 
the “design”—precisely the issue courts are now struggling with in the context 
of design patent remedies.378 
2. Channeling 
The intellectual property system could rely on channeling doctrines rather 
than a doctrine of election to eliminate overlapping protection for design, 
thereby reducing concerns about different claiming methodologies. 
Channeling doctrines are rules that “channel” particular subject matter to the 
particular intellectual property system intended for it, and intellectual 
property laws contain many such doctrines already.379 For example, copyright 
 
376 Supra Section III.B. 
377 See McKenna, Alternate Approach, supra note 369, at 891 (proposing a doctrine of election 
between utility patent and trademark laws that “would force a firm to elect between forms of protection 
at the product level”). 
378 For a discussion of how to identify the relevant article of manufacture, and thereby to 
determine the proper unit of a design, see Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” Today, supra note 32, 812-31. 
379 For more on how existing doctrines channel works between utility patent and copyright, utility 
patent and trademark, utility patent and design patent, and copyright and trademark, see generally 
Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality, supra note 2; see also Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright 
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law’s useful articles doctrine channels out of copyright law and to utility or 
design patent law, if anywhere, certain aspects of a useful article. Pursuant to 
this doctrine, copyright law excludes from protection the “utilitarian aspects 
of [a useful] article” and “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can[not] 
be identified separately from [or are not] capable of existing independently 
of” those utilitarian aspects.380 Trademark law’s functionality doctrine 
channels to utility patent law protection of features that are “essential to the 
use or purpose” or “affect[] the cost or quality” of an article.381 In the design 
context, channeling doctrines would direct certain designs solely to design 
patent, others solely to copyright, and still others solely to trademark. 
A channeling doctrine for designs would be an alternative to a doctrine of 
election, with the similar effect of forbidding overlapping protection for 
designs. The biggest difference is that designers would not choose which form 
of protection they’d prefer; instead, courts or lawmakers would set the rules 
that would determine which designs would be considered the subject matter 
of design patent, trademark, or copyright. That means we would not be 
leveraging designers’ experience and knowledge to identify, at the retail level, 
the best form of protection. On the other hand, channeling doctrines would 
also prevent designers from choosing a form of protection that provides 
private benefits but social costs. Instead, these channeling doctrines would 
consider at the wholesale level which design protection regimes are socially 
optimal for particular types of design—which is not to say that those regimes 
would always afford protection in individual cases. 
Channeling doctrines also have the benefit of operating on designs from 
the moment they become protectable, meaning that there would always be at 
most one form of protection for a design. Unlike a doctrine of election, it 
would therefore be irrelevant that a designer need not claim rights in a design 
until enforcement. Third parties could consult the laws’ channeling doctrines 
to determine which regime the design lies within, whether or not the designer 
has yet asserted rights under that regime. This choice has benefits for 
designers too because their decisions about whether to pursue design patent 
protection at the outset are simplified: the designers need not weigh the 
uncertain costs and benefits of electing design patent because the channeling 
rules will dictate which regime is available. 
 
Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55 (2007); McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6; Mark P. McKenna 
& Lucas Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1425 (2017). 
380 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). See generally Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion’s Function, supra note 31; 
Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality, supra note 2; supra Section I.C. 
381 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (citing Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). See generally McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, supra note 6. 
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Just as with a doctrine of election, channeling should happen at the level 
of the design rather than for particular design elements.382 Although this 
decision would also raise difficult questions about what features constitute a 
“design,” we think it is preferable to piecemeal protection under different 
regimes for different design elements. 
In all, instituting either a doctrine of election or channeling doctrines for 
design would, in addition to addressing the concerns of those disturbed by the 
extent of overlapping protection for design,383 resolve the concerns about 
overlapping and different claiming methodologies. That said, for those who are 
comfortable with overlapping protections for design, introducing a doctrine of 
election or channeling doctrine for design might seem to be too drastic a measure 
to cure the claiming problems afflicting design protection. For that group, we 
propose implementing a transsubstantive claiming regime, to which we now turn. 
B. Transsubstantive Claiming 
Transsubstantive law—a layer of law that applies across different areas of 
substantive law—tends to be most familiar in the contexts of remedies384 and 
civil and criminal procedure.385 It has, in the main, not been a feature of 
intellectual property law.386 For claiming specifically, there might be good 
reasons for the differences in methodology across regimes, reasons that 
relate to the purposes of those regimes. As the extent of overlapping 
protection increases, however, the variations in claiming methodology 
become costlier because multiple rights, each with different claiming 
 
382 Supra text accompanying note 377. 
383 See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 70 
(2016) (suggesting that patent law should factor in effects on creative activities and copyright should 
consider technological innovation, including by using obviousness or novelty tests to decide what 
counts as fair use); McKenna, Alternate Approach, supra note 369, at 875, 894-96 (calling for 
policymakers to factor in the interplay between different intellectual property protections when 
shaping the scope and duration of the protection offered by each). 
384 Perhaps not surprisingly, some have focused on remedies as a solution to the overlap 
problem. See, e.g., Heymann, Overlapping, supra note 7, at 241-42 (suggesting that courts allow 
multiple forms of protection but limit the remedies to those necessary to address the specific harms 
of the specific use at issue). We are skeptical that transsubstantive remedies would resolve the 
claiming concerns discussed here because they would not fix claiming upfront, although they could 
help limit the collateral damage by minimizing strategic behavior of rightsholders seeking to 
maximize remedies across design protection regimes. 
385 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for example, offers the ability to bring a class action for 
any violation of federal law so long as certain prerequisites are met. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. But see J. 
Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625, 1627 
(2017) (positing that the only way to understand the Supreme Court’s recent Rule 23 jurisprudence 
is to “look past the procedural veneer and consider the underlying substantive rules and remedial 
regimes at stake”). 
386 But cf. Beckerman-Rodau, Problem, supra note 7, at 89 (arguing for increased collaboration 
between, or even the unification of, the agencies that administer each branch of intellectual property law). 
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methodologies, are more frequently asserted for the same design. A 
transsubstantive claiming regime would alleviate the problems with these 
multiple claiming methodologies, and it would do so in a more targeted 
fashion than a doctrine of election or channeling doctrine.387 
A complete description of a transsubstantive claiming regime is beyond the 
scope of this Article. But one goal of such a system should be to improve claim 
stability over time, both within a case and across cases. It is true that one area 
of design protection—trademark law—emphasizes consumer understanding, 
and for that reason, it recognizes that rights might change over time. But 
whatever the merits of that approach generally, we have seen the mischief it can 
cause in the context of design. Thus, at the very least, a claimant should bear 
the burden of establishing that there is a good reason, such as an 
overwhelmingly changed consumer understanding, to accept an evolving claim. 
One way to operationalize that burden shifting would be to deny a 
presumption of validity with regard to rights that are inconsistent with 
those previously claimed—perhaps in the context of registration—and to 
extend the presumption only to design as originally claimed. A slightly 
stronger version would be to apply estoppel principles across time, so that 
a party that claimed one way in one case would be barred from claiming the 
design differently in other cases. 
In terms of format, we tentatively propose a system with both visual and 
verbal claims. Courts in all areas of design protection have concerns about 
verbal claiming because it can result in losing sight of the overall design. At 
the same time, visual claims often cannot be interpreted without verbal 
description of particular features, especially in the common circumstance in 
which some (perhaps many) of the features are not protectable standing 
alone. The optimal claiming methodology would draw the best from both 
modes of claiming to account for the concerns about those modes. More 
specifically, we think in many cases claims will be most intelligible when they 
visually depict the claimed features and then verbally describe which aspects 
are not claimed. Focusing on the features not claimed will help avoid verbal 
overshadowing while addressing the central concern about visual claiming, 
namely that unprotectable features will be weighted inappropriately in 
assessing validity, infringement, or both. 
 
387 In this regard, a consideration of the virtues and vices of transsubstantive claiming for 
design replicates debates that occur about transsubstantive law in other areas, like civil procedure: 
the practicality and ease of a “one size fits all” law versus a multiplicity of laws that are finely and 
appropriately attuned to their respective contexts. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery 
Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 
(1989); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay 
on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010). 
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CONCLUSION 
At the outset, we noted how striking good design can be. While we hope 
it continues to be so, we think design protection regimes should become less 
striking by undoing the mischief they cause through their widely varying 
claiming methodologies. This multiplicity of claiming regimes undermines the 
quality of notice that design claims provide third parties about claim scope. 
These notice problems are ironic because intellectual property claims exist 
almost entirely to provide notice. Claim ambiguity and a party’s ability to 
switch back and forth between different design claims—both within and across 
legal regimes—make it difficult for courts or third parties to evaluate the 
validity and scope of rights. Cumulation also enables design rightsholders to 
assert rights in one or more regimes using the claiming rules that benefit them 
most at a particular moment, without any material consequences to claiming 
the design differently at a later time. We think that any of our proposed 
solutions—a doctrine of election, channeling doctrine, and a transsubstantive 
claiming methodology—would ameliorate these concerns, thereby enabling 
third parties to better assess their freedom to operate and create other designs. 
Design protection regimes ought to be improved to encourage the creation of 
good designs, without also causing confusion about claim scope. 
